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ABSTRACT 
Does the Maine Constitution afford guarantees for individual rights that are 
independent of those afforded by the United States Constitution?  As set forth in Part 
I, the answer to this question is “yes.”  Because state constitutions are a “font of 
individual liberties,” the Law Court has adopted the primacy approach to interpreting 
the 200-year-old Maine Constitution.  Under this approach, state courts must 
consider state constitutional claims before reaching any federal claims and must not 
give controlling weight to the interpretation given to the United States Constitution.  
This approach gives the state constitution the significance that it deserves as a 
consequential guarantor of the rights of Maine people, comports with principles of 
federalism, and promotes judicial restraint.   
Because the Maine Constitution does afford independent protections for 
individual rights, a further question arises:  Does the scope of the rights protected 
under the Declaration of Rights differ meaningfully from those secured in the Bill of 
Rights?  As discussed in Part II, the text and history of the Maine Constitution 
indicates that at least some of the guarantees set forth in the Declaration of Rights 
are broader than those set out in the first ten amendments to the United States 
Constitution.  In particular, the free exercise clause in Article I, Section 3 of the 
Maine Constitution is more expansive than its counterpart in the First Amendment, 
as it has been interpreted in Employment Division v. Smith.  Article I, Section 3 
contains specific language ensuring that the state may not burden the free exercise 
of religion absent limited, compelling government interests.  This text reflects the 
founders’ commitment, clearly expressed in the constitutional debates prior to the 
adoption of the Maine Constitution, to a generous conception of religious liberty.   
As this Article concludes, the Law Court’s primacy approach is sound.  Only a 
firm commitment to independently interpreting the state constitution will ensure that 
the liberties guaranteed therein will be adequately protected. 
INTRODUCTION 
“Permit me, gentlemen, to hope that the constitution with which God has been 
pleased through you to bless us may long preserve the liberties and promote the 
happiness of all our fellow citizens, and that for your services you may not only 
receive the respect of the virtuous of your own times, but the regard of posterity.” 
 
William King, President, Constitutional Convention of the State of Maine,  
1819-18201 
 
In 1819, delegates gathered in a constitutional convention to prepare the 
foundational governing document for the nascent State of Maine.2  They might have 
                                                                                                     
 1.  THE DEBATES AND JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF THE STATE OF MAINE 
(1819-1820), 135 (1894) [hereinafter DEBATES AND JOURNAL]. 
 2.  274 delegates gathered at the constitutional convention.  See LOUIS CLINTON HATCH, I MAINE: 
A HISTORY 147 (1919); RONALD F. BANKS, MAINE BECOMES A STATE: THE MOVEMENT TO SEPARATE 
MAINE FROM MASSACHUSETTS 1785-1820 150 (1970). 
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reasonably expected that the courts established under that constitution would closely 
consider its text rather than rotely interpret it as a carbon copy of the United States 
Constitution.  Had the latter approach occurred to the delegates, they might have 
dispensed with debating the words used to secure the rights of Maine citizens.  But 
debate those words they did, over the course of more than two weeks.3  Together, the 
delegates produced a remarkable document that would continue to govern the State 
over the two centuries that have since passed.   
Honoring the work of those delegates, the Maine Law Court4 has chosen to adopt 
an independent approach to interpreting the Maine Constitution rather than to 
construe the State’s founding document as a carbon copy of its federal counterpart.  
The Law Court has expressly endorsed the “primacy approach” to state constitutional 
interpretation,5 a doctrine that rests on two fundamental tenets:  that state courts 
should resolve state constitutional issues before reaching federal constitutional 
issues, and that federal court opinions interpreting the United States Constitution are 
merely helpful guides when interpreting the state constitution.6  The primacy 
approach protects the state constitution’s role as guarantor of the rights of Maine 
citizens, comports with judicial federalism, and conforms to principles of judicial 
restraint.  In short, it ensures that state courts do not “abdicate [their] function of 
conclusively resolving matters of purely state law,”7 but instead exercise their 
“authority and important responsibility to construe the Maine Constitution.”8  The 
primacy approach “has not been consistently followed,” however, and has at times 
“been all but ignored.”9  Despite its halting application of the primacy approach, the 
Law Court has nevertheless recently reaffirmed its commitment to that doctrine.10  
An examination of the free exercise clause in Maine’s Declaration of Rights 
demonstrates the necessity of faithfully applying the primacy approach.  In Blount v. 
Department of Educational and Cultural Services, the Law Court applied a 
“substantial burden” test under the Maine free exercise clause:  that laws placing a 
substantial burden on the free exercise of religion are unconstitutional absent a 
compelling state interest.11  This test coincided with the then-prevailing approach to 
                                                                                                     
 3.  The convention began on October 11, 1819, and adjourned on October 29, 1819.  See DEBATES 
AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 44-45, 370.   
 4.  Maine’s highest court, the Supreme Judicial Court, is known as the Law Court when sitting as 
the court of final appeal. 
 5.  See State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __ (stating that the Court applies the 
primacy approach to state constitutional interpretation); State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 34, __ A.3d __ 
(Connors, J., concurring) (observing that the Law Court has “explicitly adopted” the primacy approach); 
State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778, 781 (Me. 1984) (noting adoption of primacy approach). 
 6.  See Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __; State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 344 (Me. 
1985); State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984). 
 7.  Dussault v. RRE Coach Lantern Holdings, L.L.C., 2014 ME 8, ¶ 27, 86 A.3d 52 (alterations 
omitted) (quoting Furhman v. Staples Off. Superstore E., Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶ 27, 58 A.3d 1083). 
 8.  All. for Retired Ams. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 123, ¶ 23, __ A.3d __. 
 9.  Marshall J. Tinkle, State Constitutional Law in Maine: At the Crossroads, 13 VT. L. REV. 61, 
62 (1988) [hereinafter Tinkle, At the Crossroads]. 
 10.  Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __; see All. for Retired Ams., 2020 ME 123, ¶ 23, __ 
A.3d __. 
 11.  Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1379, 1385 (Me. 1988) (explaining 
the test under the federal free exercise clause and equating the protections provided under the Maine free 
exercise clause with the protections available under the United States Constitution). 
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federal free exercise claims.12  Just two years later, however, the United States 
Supreme Court fundamentally altered its free exercise jurisprudence in Employment 
Division v. Smith, concluding that “neutral” laws withstand constitutional scrutiny 
regardless of the burden on any religious believer.13  Many state courts changed 
course to follow Smith, while others continued to apply the pre-Smith test.14  The 
Maine Law Court followed the latter path.15  Had the Law Court ignored the primacy 
approach and followed Smith, it would have adopted an approach at odds with a fair 
reading of the Declaration of Rights.   
Both the text and history of the free exercise clause support Blount.  Article I, 
Section 3 of the Maine Constitution guarantees that “no person shall be hurt, 
molested or restrained in that person’s liberty or estate for worshipping God in the 
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of that person’s own conscience, 
nor for that person’s religious professions or sentiments”—a right only constrained 
if its exercise would “disturb the public peace” or “obstruct others in their religious 
worship.”16  This language does more than create a corollary to Smith’s non-
discrimination principle; indeed, Section 3 contains a separate clause guaranteeing 
equal protection.17  Instead, it precludes the state from limiting an individual’s 
religious practices, beliefs, or expressions absent compelling state interests.  
Moreover, the framers adopted this language after a lengthy debate in which they 
expressed their resolve to provide robust protection for free exercise.18  Section 3 is, 
in short, incompatible with Smith.   
This Article considers anew the justifications for the Law Court’s primacy 
approach and demonstrates that the primacy approach avoids fundamentally 
misinterpreting Article I, Section 3 of the Maine Constitution.  Part I of this Article 
explains the primacy approach and argues that the primacy approach is the most 
appropriate method of constitutional interpretation.  Part II of this Article shows how 
failing to follow the primacy approach would inappropriately curtail the scope of the 
right to free exercise under Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights.  Specifically, Part 
II demonstrates that the right to free exercise of religion protected by Section 3 is 
broader than that protected under Smith.  In sum, this Article urges a renewed 
commitment to a vibrant, independent approach to state constitutional interpretation, 
including free exercise jurisprudence.   
                                                                                                     
 12.  Id.; see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221-29 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 
406-07 (1963). 
 13.  See Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-90 (1990); see also Kennedy v. 
Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 634, 637 (2019) (mem.) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) 
(noting that Smith “drastically cut back on the protection provided by the Free Exercise Clause”). 
 14.  See Paul Benjamin Linton, Religious Freedom Claims and Defenses Under State Constitutions, 
7 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 103, 186-89 (2013). 
 15.  See Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 56, 871 A.2d 1208 (stating 
that the Law Court has “expressly acknowledged” that it has not adopted the “holding in Smith” under 
Article I, Section 3); MARSHALL J. TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION 31 (2d ed. 2013) 
[hereinafter TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION].   
 16.  ME. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 17.  Id. (“[A]ll persons . . . shall be equally under the protection of the laws . . . .”). 
 18.  DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra note 1, at 92-115. 
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I. THE PRIMACY APPROACH TO STATE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
State constitutions, like the United States Constitution, contain meaningful 
guarantees protecting individual rights, and state courts do not exist solely to afford 
citizens the full protections of the federal constitution.  As Justice Brennan wrote, 
“[s]tate constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties,”19 the particulars of which 
might differ from the federal constitution.  Because of this basic fact, the Law Court 
has expressly adopted the primacy approach, whereby courts must interpret the 
Maine Constitution independently of the United States Constitution.20  Maine is one 
of several states to adopt the primacy approach, which began to gain jurisprudential 
traction in the late 1970s and early 1980s in conjunction with a renewed focus in 
academia on the importance of state constitutions.21   
The primacy approach is a sound mode of constitutional interpretation.  It stands 
in contrast to, and rejects, a “parallelism” approach whereby a court construes state 
constitutional provisions “as being precisely conterminous with their counterparts” 
in the United States Constitution.”22  It also departs from an “interstitial” approach, 
“whereby the state constitution is consulted only when the state court is dissatisfied 
with the federal doctrine.”23  The primacy approach gives the Maine Constitution the 
significance that it deserves as a carefully drafted, consequential guarantor of the 
rights and liberties of the people of Maine; reflects its rightful position within our 
Republic’s federal structure; and allows state courts to avoid expounding on federal 
constitutional issues that they need not reach.   
                                                                                                     
 19.  William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977). 
 20.  See State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __ ; State v. Rowe, 480 A.2d 778, 781 
(Me. 1984); see also Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 62. 
 21.  See Robert F. Williams, State Constitutional Religion Clauses: Lessons from the New Judicial 
Federalism, 7 U. ST. THOMAS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 192, 192-93 (2013); G. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial 
Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1097-98 (1997).  The seminal article 
precipitating the new judicial federalism revolution was written by Justice Brennan in 1977.  See Robert 
F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism’s First Generation, 30 VAL. U. L. 
REV. xiii, xv (1996).  Maine was not alone in adopting an autonomous approach to interpreting state 
charters in the early 1980’s.  Among other states, Massachusetts and New Hampshire have also 
reaffirmed the independent force of their state constitutions.  See Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 
548, 555 (Mass. 1985); State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983).  It is unsurprising that New 
England states have been leaders in this independent approach, given the rich constitutional history of 
the region—many of these states’ charters have roots pre-dating the United States Constitution.  See 
Roderick J. Ireland, How We Do It in Massachusetts: An Overview of How the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court Has Interpreted Its State Constitution to Address Contemporary Legal Issues, 38 VAL. U. 
L. REV. 406, 407 (2004). 
 22.  Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 74; see also Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and 
Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and Federal 
Courts, 63 TEX. L. REV. 977, 983 (1985) (noting that some states “tie their decisions to both the state 
and federal constitutions”). 
 23.  Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 95; see also Pollock, supra note 22, at 983-84 
(noting that, under the interstitial, or “supplemental,” approach, a court “looks first to the federal 
constitution” and generally only reaches the state constitution if “the status of the litigant’s rights are 
questionable under the United States Constitution, or if the asserted violation of rights is found valid 
under that document”). 
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A. The Primacy Approach Explained 
The primacy approach has been aptly summarized by Justice Hans Linde, an 
early champion of the “new judicial federalism” that revived the primacy approach.24  
According to Justice Linde, the proper inquiry under a state constitution is not 
whether a particular state guarantee is the same as or broader than its federal 
counterpart.25  Rather,  
The right question is what the state’s guarantee means and how it applies to the case 
at hand.  The answer may turn out the same as it would under federal law.  The 
state’s law may turn out to be more protective than federal law.  The state law also 
may be less protective.  In that case, the court must go on to decide the claim under 
federal law, assuming it has been raised.26 
In short, analysis of a state constitutional question must proceed on its own, fully 
independent of any federal constitutional issues.  The point of the primacy approach 
is that a state’s constitutional guarantees “were meant to be and remain genuine 
guarantees against misuse of the state’s governmental powers, truly independent of 
the rising and falling tides of federal case law.”27   
As explained by the Law Court, the primacy approach directs Maine courts to 
“forbear from ruling on federal constitutional issues before consulting [the] state 
constitution.”28  Thus, when an individual “invokes the protection” of the Maine 
Constitution, courts “will . . . examine the state constitutional claim before reaching 
any federal question.”29  State courts are charged with the responsibility to determine 
the “maximum statement of the substantive content” of a state constitutional 
guarantee.30  Only if the state court concludes that the claims under the state 
constitution fail should the court take up and consider the claims “from [the] 
standpoint of federal constitutional law.”31  Accordingly, a court should not look to 
the federal constitution first and express “restraint” in giving the state constitution a 
different construction.32   
The primacy approach also directs state courts to use federal court opinions 
interpreting the United States Constitution as “helpful guides” to interpreting the 
                                                                                                     
 24.  Tarr, supra note 21, at 1098 & n.7.  The now-old “new judicial federalism” has been the subject 
of much analysis, see id. 1097 n.3, which is beyond the scope of this article.  This article provides an 
overview primarily from a Maine jurisprudential perspective.   
 25.   See Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus—Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 
179 (1984). 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  Oregon v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1323 (Or. 1983).   
 28.  State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984); see State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 
n.9, __ A.3d __ (“Under the primacy approach applied by this Court, we first look to the Maine 
Constitution . . . .” (internal citation omitted)). 
 29.  State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 344 (Me. 1985); see State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 34, __ A.3d __ 
(Connors, J., concurring) (“[W]hen properly raised and developed, we interpret the Maine Constitution 
first, examining—independently of the United States Constitution—the constitutional question pursuant 
to Maine values.”). 
 30.  State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982). 
 31.  Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1150; see Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 34, __ A.3d __ (Connors, J., concurring); 
State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349 (Me. 1984). 
 32.  Nevertheless, the Court has at times taken exactly this approach.  See, e.g., State v. Buzzell, 617 
A.2d 1016, 1018 n.4 (Me. 1992). 
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Maine Constitution rather than as precedent determinative of the scope of state 
constitutional guarantees.33  Of course, the Law Court has “high regard” for the 
Supreme Court’s opinions, “particularly when they provide insight into the origin of 
provisions common to the state and federal bills of rights rather than only a 
contemporary ‘balance’ of pragmatic considerations about which reasonable people 
may differ over time and among the several states.”34  Properly viewed, however, 
“federal decisions do not serve to establish the complete statement of controlling 
law.”35  Federal case law is merely persuasive, and its persuasiveness depends on the 
similarity of the constitutional provisions at issue (both textually and historically) as 
well as the soundness of its reasoning.  It neither compels a particular conclusion 
under the Maine Constitution nor “diminish[es] . . . the independent sufficiency” of 
that document.36 
B. Justifications for the Primacy Approach 
The primacy approach is, as the Law Court has recognized, the best method of 
state constitutional interpretation.37  It is the only approach that fully protects the 
rights secured by the Maine Constitution.  The primacy approach also fits best with 
principles of federalism, and promotes well-accepted principles of judicial restraint.   
                                                                                                     
 33.  Flick, 495 A.2d at 344; see Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __ (“[F]ederal precedent 
serv[es] as potentially persuasive but not dispositive guidance with respect to constitutional provisions 
with similar goals.”). 
 34.  Id. at 344 n.2 (quoting Oregon v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1321 (Or. 1983)). 
 35.  Caouette, 446 A.2d at 1122; see All. for Retired Ams. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 ME 123, ¶ 23, __ 
A.3d __ (stating that the interpretations of other constitutions by other courts does not control the 
interpretation of the Maine Constitution); Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶ 33, __ A.3d __ (Connors, J., concurring) 
(observing that federal precedent does not bind state courts when interpreting state constitutions); State 
v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, ¶¶ 5, 9, 748 A.2d 976 (noting that the Law Court is “not confined” by Supreme 
Court precedent).  This accords with the Supreme Court’s own view of the effect of its decisions on 
state constitutional law.  See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041 (1983) (“It is fundamental that 
state courts be left free and unfettered by us in interpreting their state constitutions.” (quoting Minnesota 
v. Nat’l Tea Co., 309 U.S. 551, 557 (1940))); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 
293 (1982) (“[A] state court is entirely free to read its own State’s constitution more broadly than this 
Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor of a 
different analysis of its corresponding constitutional guarantee.”); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 
(1972) (“[T]he States are free, pursuant to their own law, to adopt a higher standard.  They may indeed 
differ as to the appropriate resolution of the values they find at stake.” (citations omitted)). 
 36.  Flick, 495 A.2d at 344.  This principle traces its roots further back into Maine jurisprudence 
than the genesis of the new judicial federalism revolution.  See Morris v. Goss, 147 Me. 89, 97, 83 A.2d 
556, 561 (1951) (“It is to be remembered that we are now interpreting our own Constitution.  In so 
doing, we are not bound by any of the interpretations which other courts may have made of their own 
Constitutions.  Nor do we follow such interpretations except to the extent that the reasoning upon which 
they rest is convincing to us when applied to our Constitution.”); see also All. for Retired Ams., 2020 
ME 123, ¶ 23, __ A.3d __ (citing Morris). 
 37.  See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 174 (2018) (“There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that 
constitutional guarantees of independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words, 
must be construed the same way.”); Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States’ Bills of 
Rights, 9 U. BALT. L. REV. 379, 381-84 (1983).  This article does not exhaustively analyze the various 
justifications for the primacy approach, but rather sets forth several themes informing the Maine Law 
Court’s primacy approach cases.   
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1. The State Constitution as the Primary Guarantor of the Rights of Maine Citizens 
The primacy approach ensures that the Maine Constitution retains its intended 
position as the primary guarantor of the rights of Maine citizens.  As the Law Court 
has recognized, the state constitution “has been the primary protector of the 
fundamental liberties of Maine people since statehood was achieved” in 1820.38  
Indeed, prior to incorporation of the federal Bill of Rights, the Maine Declaration of 
Rights provided the sole source of protections for Maine citizens vis-à-vis state law.39  
As in other states, the “sovereign people [of Maine] gave limited powers to the State 
government,” and adopted provisions meant to “protect[] the people from 
governmental excesses and potential abuses.”40  The Maine Constitution was 
therefore imbued with tremendous significance at its drafting and ratification, and it 
has lost none of that significance.  “The Federal Bill of Rights did not supersede 
those of the states.”41   
In designing the Declaration of Rights, the framers drew from multiple 
constitutional sources to adopt broad guarantees of individual liberty.  The Maine 
Constitution—though based perhaps primarily on the Massachusetts Constitution of 
1780, written by John Adams—reflects the influence of various constitutions then in 
effect, along with the advice of such founding luminaries as James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson.42  The Maine Constitution “contains purposeful differences in 
emphases, inclusions, omissions, and phraseology” from both the Massachusetts 
Constitution and the United States Constitution—variations that the framers 
intentionally adopted.43  In drafting Maine’s unique constitution and “[i]n selecting 
the appropriate articulation of a given constitutional right, the framers of the Maine 
Constitution tended to favor the most generous formulation available.”44  They thus 
chose “to enlarge the number of individual rights expressly guaranteed; to employ 
terminology that was expansive rather than constricted, particular rather than 
abstract, obligatory rather than hortative; and to emphasize freedom from 
government interference as an overarching principle.”45   
The framers, then, did not simply copy any existing constitution, including the 
United States Constitution; instead, they sought to—and did—create a unique 
                                                                                                     
 38.  State v. Larrivee, 479 A.2d 347, 349 (Me. 1984). 
 39.  See SUTTON, supra note 37, at 179 (noting that state constitutions are the “first bulwarks of 
freedom”); Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 68.  
 40.  State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983). 
 41.  Linde, supra note 37, at 381. 
 42.  See Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9 at 63-67, 66 n.27; TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE 
CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 5-7; BANKS, supra note 2, at 153-54. 
 43.  Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 101.  For instance, “the Maine Declaration of Rights 
removed the barriers to the free exercise of religion that had been erected in Massachusetts.”  Id. at 64.  
Maine’s free exercise clause is also significantly more detailed than its federal counterpart.  The unique 
aspects of Maine’s free exercise clause are discussed further in Part II(B), infra.  Other differences can 
be seen, for example, in the freedom of speech as well as search and seizure provisions.  Id. at 64, 66.  
See also BANKS, supra note 2, at 153-55. 
 44.  Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 66.  
 45.  Id. at 67.   
2020] REAFFIRMING THE PRIMACY APPROACH 9 
document with independent guarantees for the liberties of the people of Maine.46  
Accordingly, absent a reasoned basis for doing so, it is inappropriate to construe the 
document as necessarily coextensive with the federal constitution.  Courts have the 
duty and “responsibility to make an independent determination of the protections 
afforded” under the Maine Constitution.47  If they fail to do so, they fail to uphold 
their oath to uphold that constitution.48     
2. Judicial Federalism 
The primacy approach also accords with the structure of the federal system, and 
the place of state constitutions within that system.  The United States Constitution 
established a system of government based on “a unique concept of federalism and 
divided sovereignty between the nation and fifty States.”49  The primacy approach 
supports this federal system in two critical ways.  First, consistent with the overall 
relationship between the states and the federal government, the primacy approach 
ensures that state courts retain the authority to interpret state law.  Second, the 
primacy approach ensures that there are two independent checks on overweening 
exercises of state power.    
As the Law Court has recognized, construing federal “opinions as expressing a 
limitation upon the scope” of state constitutional rights “would be to stand the state-
federal relationship and the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United 
States on their heads.”50  Our federal system reserves to the states “a substantial 
portion of the Nation’s primary sovereignty.”51  It is well established that states 
“retain ‘a residuary and inviolable sovereignty,’” and are not “relegated to the role 
of mere provinces or political corporations.”52  A strict parallelism, which would 
ensure that state constitutions are construed in accord with federal precedent, would 
undermine this federal structure.  Under this approach, the Supreme Court would 
have the power to effectively overrule state law precedent and implicitly alter the 
scope of state constitutions, thereby subjecting state courts and state constitutions to 
shifts in doctrine at the federal level.53  The primacy approach, in contrast, ensures 
that state constitutions do not “swing[] on the Supreme Court’s pendulum.”54  
                                                                                                     
 46.  BANKS, supra note 2, at 153-54.  See generally State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982) 
(“[O]ur constitution is not a mere reflection of the federal charter.  Historically and textually, it differs . . 
. .  It is an independent authority.”). 
 47.  State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 350 (N.H. 1983); see All. for Retired Ams. v. Sec’y of State, 2020 
ME 123, ¶ 23, __ A.3d __ (noting the Law Court’s “responsibility” to construe the Maine Constitution); 
Ireland, supra note 21, at 407 (“Because the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights is a sovereign 
document, the SJC has an obligation to make an independent determination of rights, liberties, and 
obligations for Massachusetts.” (quotation marks and alterations omitted)). 
 48.  Ball, 471 A.2d at 350. 
 49.  Id.   
 50.  State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982). 
 51.  Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999). 
 52.  Id. (quoting The Federalist No. 39); see Ireland, supra note 21, at 407.  
 53.  See SUTTON, supra note 37, at 183. 
 54.  Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 99.  It is not even necessary for there to be shifts in 
federal doctrine in order for parallelism to wreak havoc on state constitutional law.  Until the Supreme 
Court speaks, state courts can merely predict what federal law will be.  See Ball, 471 A.2d at 351.  As a 
result, when state courts assert that federal and state constitutional law are coextensive and then opine 
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The primacy approach also protects federalism by recognizing and respecting 
the fact that the federal structure was adopted in order to create a “double security . 
. . to the rights of the people.”55  The “genius of federalism” is that it ensures that 
fundamental rights are protected by not only the United States Constitution, but also 
state constitutions.56  This “double security” has real value.  While courts interpreting 
the Bill of Rights, as incorporated against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment, must “give consideration to the nature of federalism,” state courts 
interpreting a state constitution are “not confronted with the problems which face 
[courts] in determining whether the right was one protected against State 
impingement . . . under the [United States] Constitution.”57  That is, while there are 
difficult questions regarding the existence and scope of particular rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment and whether those rights are incorporated against the 
States,58 such questions need not be addressed in order to adjudicate a claimed 
violation of a state constitutional right.  Accordingly, if state courts conflate their 
own state’s charter with the United States Constitution, they vitiate the federalist 
structure that was designed to protect the rights of the people59—and potentially 
deprive the people of those rights.   
3. Judicial Restraint 
The primacy approach also promotes principles of judicial restraint.  “[I]t is a 
fundamental rule of appellate procedure to avoid expressing opinions on 
constitutional questions when some other resolution of the issues renders a 
constitutional ruling unnecessary.”60  Likewise, a court should “forbear from ruling 
on federal constitutional issues before consulting [the] state constitution.”61   
There are several reasons for exercising such restraint.  Reaching federal issues 
prior to resolving any state law issues is imprudent, as it creates the significant 
possibility of “friction between state and federal judiciaries.”62  Moreover, reaching 
federal issues first is unsound analytically, as there is “no legal basis for addressing 
                                                                                                     
on an area of law that the Supreme Court has not addressed, it leaves state law subject to unexpected 
changes.  The difficulty this creates is immediately apparent.  For instance, in State v. Tozier, the Law 
Court first implied that the Fourth Amendment and Article 1, Section 5 are coextensive and then held—
in the absence of Supreme Court case law on point—that a police officer “does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment when the officer randomly checks a license plate number of a vehicle on a public road, 
learns the owner’s license has been suspended and revoked, and observes no other circumstances that 
demonstrate the driver is not the vehicle’s owner.”  2006 ME 105, ¶¶ 6-10, 905 A.2d 836.  What if the 
Supreme Court were to take up a similar case and decide to the contrary?  Would Tozier be good law?  
Or would the scope of the state constitutional guarantee change?  Such difficulties are avoided if state 
courts take care to independently interpret the state constitution.  See Ball, 471 A.2d at 351; State v. 
Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982).   
 55.  Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 459 (1991) (quoting The Federalist No. 51); see SUTTON, 
supra note 37, at 11. 
 56.  State v. Hempele, 576 A.2d 793, 800 (N.J. 1990); see SUTTON, supra note 37, at 175. 
 57.  Danforth v. Dep’t of Health &Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973). 
 58.  See generally Nelson Lund, Federalism and Civil Liberties, 45 U. Kan. L. Rev. 1045, 1058-59, 
1059 n.48 (1997) (noting complexity of debate over incorporation). 
 59.  Ball, 471 A.2d at 350. 
 60.  State v. Cadman, 476 A.2d 1148, 1150 (Me. 1984). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (Vt. 1982).  
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issues of federal constitutional law” if an individual may obtain a remedy under state 
law.63  The federal Bill of Rights only applies to the states as a result of incorporation 
through the Fourteenth Amendment.64  But there is no need to consider the federal 
constitution when the state constitution provides an adequate remedy.  If a State 
recognizes and protects a citizen’s rights under state law, then the State has not 
deprived that citizen of any Fourteenth Amendment rights.65  Finally, by reaching 
and resolving state constitutional issues first, a court provides litigants with a final 
disposition of the case by precluding the necessity of federal review.66  The primacy 
approach therefore appropriately directs courts to first determine whether a state 
remedy exists before turning, as a last resort, to the United States Constitution.  
C. Application of the Primacy Approach by the Maine Law Court  
Applying the primacy approach, the Law Court has had no difficulty concluding 
in a wide variety of instances—and for a wide variety of reasons—that the guarantees 
contained in the Declaration of Rights differ in scope from the Bill of Rights.67  On 
some occasions, the Law Court has concluded that textual differences require it to 
interpret the Maine Constitution differently than the federal Constitution.68  
However, these textual differences have not been the sine qua non for interpreting 
the two constitutions differently.69  In other instances, the court has relied upon 
                                                                                                     
 63.  Freedom Socialist Party v. Bradbury, 48 P.3d 199, 205 (Or. 2002) (Landau, J., concurring). 
 64.  See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1122 (Me. 1982). 
 65.  Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1150; see Sterling v. Cupp, 625 P.2d 123, 126 (Or. 1981); Freedom 
Socialist Party, 48 P.3d at 205 (Landau, J., concurring); SUTTON, supra note 37, at 180-81 (“When a 
state court arrests the relevant state action under its own constitution, any deprivation of life, liberty, or 
property or denial of equal protection evaporates.”); Linde, supra note 23, at 383 (“Whenever a person 
asserts a particular right, and a state court recognizes and protects that right under state law, then the 
state is not depriving the person of whatever federal claim he or she might otherwise assert. There is no 
federal question.”). 
 66.  Badger, 450 A.3d at 449; see Ireland, supra note 21, at 407-08 (“The Supreme Court will not 
overrule a decision . . . based solely on state law.”).   
 67.  See, e.g., State v. Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __ (stating that the right to an 
impartial jury under Article I, Section 6 is not necessarily coextensive with the U.S. Constitution); 
Fortin v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 56, 871 A.2d 1208 (free exercise analysis 
under Article I, Section 3 is more rigorous than under the First Amendment); Caouette, 446 A.2d at 
1122 (privilege against self-incrimination is broader under Article I, Section 6 than under the Fifth 
Amendment); State v. Sklar, 317 A.2d 160, 170-71 (Me. 1974) (right to a jury trial is more expansive 
under Article I, Section 6 than under the Sixth Amendment); Danforth v. State Dep’t of Health & 
Welfare, 303 A.2d 794, 800 (Me. 1973) (due process right to counsel in child custody cases is broader 
under Article I, Section 6 than under the Fourteenth Amendment).  See also State v. Rees, 2000 ME 55, 
¶¶ 4-9, 748 A.2d 977 (declining to “retreat from the more restrictive state standard” in Caouette).  Cf. 
State v. Bouchles, 457 A.2d 798, 801-02 (Me. 1983) (noting that the Law Court has expressly “rejected 
any straightjacket approach by which [the court] would automatically adopt the federal construction of 
the Fourth Amendment ban of ‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ as the meaning of the nearly 
identical provision of the Maine Constitution” and has “acknowledge[d] a duty to declare independently 
the meaning of the search-and-seizure clause of the Maine Constitution,” but nevertheless following 
persuasive federal precedent in the absence of Maine authority, without independent analysis). 
 68.  See, e.g., Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 56, 871 A.2d 1208; Sklar, 317 A.2d at 166-67.   
 69.  As the Law Court concluded in Flick, the protection provided by a particular provision in the 
Maine Constitution “does not depend on the interpretation of the federal Constitution” even if the 
relevant texts are materially indistinguishable.  State v. Flick, 495 A.2d 339, 343 (Me. 1985) (emphasis 
in original).  According to the Law Court, such similarities “do[ ] not support the non sequitur that the 
12 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 73:1 
differences in the history of the provisions,70 its prior jurisprudence,71 or its own 
judgment regarding the balancing of public policies.72  The Law Court has thus 
utilized a variety of rationales to support its independent interpretation of the Maine 
Constitution under the primacy approach.73  When carefully applied, the primacy 
approach encourages thoughtful analysis of the text, history, structure, and common 
law pertinent to the relevant state constitutional provision.74 
The Law Court, however, has not always hewed to the primacy approach that it 
has expressly espoused and has thereby jeopardized the vitality of the rights 
guaranteed under the Maine Constitution.75  At times, the Law Court has appeared 
to apply a parallelism approach by stating that a particular provision is “interpreted 
coextensively with its federal counterpart.”76  In such cases, it has not independently 
examined the Maine Constitution, and has treated federal case law as controlling.77  
                                                                                                     
United States Supreme Court’s decisions under such a text not only deserve respect but presumptively 
fix its correct meaning also in state constitutions.”  Id. (quoting State v. Kennedy, 666 P.2d 1316, 1322 
(Or. 1983)).  See Cadman, 476 A.2d at 1150 (applying primacy approach despite lack of meaningful 
textual differences between the speedy trial guarantees of Article I, Section 6 and the Sixth 
Amendment). 
 70.  See Sklar, 317 A.2d at 167-68.   
 71.  See, e.g., Fortin, 2005 ME 57, ¶¶ 41, 55, 871 A.2d 1208; Flick, 495 A.2d at 343. 
 72.  See, e.g., Fleming, 2020 ME 120, ¶ 17 n.9, __ A.3d __; Danforth, 303 A.2d at 801; State v. 
Collins, 297 A.2d 620, 626-27 (Me. 1972). 
 73.  Massachusetts’ courts have done likewise.  See Ireland, supra note 21, at 409-18 (explaining 
how the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has relied on “textual analysis, history, common law, 
structural difference, and comparison to other states”). 
 74.  The importance of such careful analysis when interpreting the state constitution should not be 
underestimated.  Mere “reliance on debates about the meaning of a federal guarantee is not apt to 
dignify the state constitutions as independent sources of law.”  SUTTON, supra note 37, at 177.  Rather 
than simply “tak[ing] sides on the federal debates and federal authorities,” state courts should “marshal[] 
the distinct state texts and histories and draw[] their own conclusions from them.”  Id.  As Justice 
Ireland of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has observed, a court’s grounding of its 
interpretive method in, among other things, “an examination of state history, a careful analysis of the 
text, [and] an investigation of the body of statutory and common law on the subject,” will “legitimize[]” 
its state constitutional analysis.  Ireland, supra note 21, at 406.  In short, a court “must be able to explain 
its decisions in terms other than the personal preferences of those who make them.”  Ireland, supra note 
21, at 409 (quoting Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State 
Constitutional Interpretation, 79 OR. L. REV. 793, 890-91 (2000)). 
 75.  The inconsistency of the Law Court on this point has been noted by multiple observers.  See, 
e.g., Jamesa J. Drake, Reviving Maine’s State Constitutional Protection Against Unreasonable Searches 
and Seizures, 68 ME. L. REV 321, 325-28 (2016); Tinkle, At the Crossroads, supra note 9, at 94-100. 
 76.  Clifford v. Me. Gen. Med. Cent., 2014 ME 60, ¶ 67 n.21, 91 A.3d 567. See, e.g., State v. 
Patterson, 2005 ME 26, ¶ 10, 868 A.2d 188 (discussing Article I, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution); 
State v. Anderson, 1999 ME 18, ¶ 9, 724 A.2d 1231 (discussing Article I, Section 6 of the Maine 
Constitution); State v. Sterling, 685 A.2d 432, 434 (Me. 1996) (discussing Article I, Section 8 of the 
Maine Constitution).   
 77.  The Law Court has even utilized this approach to interpret a particular constitutional provision 
despite acknowledging, at other times, that the very same provision may afford “additional protections” 
unavailable under its federal counterpart.  Compare State v. Glover, 2014 ME 49, ¶ 10 n.2, 89 A.3d 
1077 (discussing Article I, Section 5 of the Maine Constitution), with Patterson, 2005 ME 26, ¶ 10, 868 
A.2d 188 (same).  Justice Connors has noted such discrepancies in the Court’s due process 
jurisprudence.  See State v. Chan, 2020 ME 91, ¶¶ 32-33, __ A.3d __ (Connors, J., concurring) (noting 
that the Law Court has stated that the state due process clause “provides no greater protection” than the 
federal due process clause, but has at other times “departed from federal concepts of due process”).    
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In other cases, the Law Court has engaged in more of an interstitial approach, 
analyzing federal constitutional claims at length before disposing summarily with 
the state constitutional claim.78  These cases are characterized by an initial 
examination of the federal constitutional claim and a subsequent determination 
regarding whether a different result should apply under state law.  The Law Court’s 
adherence to the primacy approach has been, therefore, uneven at best.  That 
inconsistency risks a stunted and improper interpretation of the Maine 
Constitution—a topic to which this Article now turns. 
II. APPLYING THE PRIMACY APPROACH TO THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE OF THE 
MAINE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS 
The Law Court’s primacy approach has led the court to avoid improperly 
narrowing the expanse of the protections afforded by the state free exercise guarantee 
contained in Article I, Section 3 of the Maine Constitution.  As a matter of state 
constitutional interpretation, the Law Court has correctly declined to follow the 
vagaries of the Supreme Court’s free exercise jurisprudence, instead recognizing that 
Maine’s Declaration of Rights provides greater protection for the free exercise of 
religion than that provided under the United States Constitution.   
In its Blount decision, the Law Court set out a multi-part test for analyzing free 
exercise claims under Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights.  As the court noted, 
that test coincided with the then-prevailing test under the free exercise clause 
contained in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.79  After the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Smith fundamentally altered the scope of the federal 
Free Exercise Clause, however, the Law Court declined to correspondingly narrow 
the free exercise guarantees contained in the Declaration of Rights.80     
As described herein, the Law Court’s jurisprudence is amply supported by both 
the text and history of Section 3.  That provision contains broad language ensuring 
that the state may not burden the free exercise of religion absent compelling 
justifications.  This language reflects the framers’ commitment to a generous 
conception of religious liberty.  Had the Law Court followed Smith, it would have 
vitiated the rights guaranteed by Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights. 
                                                                                                     
 78.  See, e.g., State v. Milliken, 2010 ME 1, ¶ 16, 985 A.2d 1152 (analyzing federal due process 
claims, and declaring that the court saw “no reason to depart from the federal standard”); City of 
Portland v. Jacobsky, 496 A.2d 646, 648-49 (Me. 1985) (acknowledging that “judicial restraint impels 
us to forbear from ruling on federal constitutional questions when the provisions of our state constitution 
may settle the matter,” but nevertheless relying entirely on federal law without analysis of state law or 
principles).    
 79.  See Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 65-66 & n.3 (Me. 1992); Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. 
& Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me. 1988).  As discussed infra Part II(B)-(C), there was good 
reason textually and historically for interpreting Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights to provide 
roughly the same protection as available under the then-prevailing interpretation of the federal Free 
Exercise Clause. 
 80.  Fortin v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, ¶ 56, 871 A.2d 1208; TINKLE, THE 
MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 30. 
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A. A Short History of Free Exercise Jurisprudence 
1. The Shifting Sand of Federal Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence 
The United States Supreme Court’s Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence has 
engendered a long and lively debate over “accommodations” of religion.81  The most 
significant aspect of this debate has focused on whether the First Amendment 
mandates that, in certain circumstances, religious believers must be granted 
exemptions (or “accommodations”) from generally applicable laws that substantially 
burden those believers’ exercise of their faith.82  In Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin 
v. Yoder, the Supreme Court set forth a test that constitutionally required exemptions 
to such laws unless the state could establish adequate justification for the 
infringement upon a believer’s conscience.83  The Supreme Court’s position on this 
point underwent a dramatic shift in 1990 with Smith, signaling an end to such 
constitutionally mandated exemptions.84  Smith generated an extended period of 
critical analysis and, as—or perhaps more—importantly, a re-invigoration of state 
free exercise jurisprudence. 
a. Sherbert and Yoder  
Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding constitutionally mandated 
accommodations of religion reached its high-water mark with the “compelling 
interest” test in Sherbert and Yoder.85  Simply stated, this test asks two questions:  
(1) does the law substantially burden the free exercise of religion?  (2) if so, is that 
burden outweighed by a compelling state interest that the law is narrowly tailored to 
serve?86  If the answer to the first question is “yes,” and the answer to the second 
“no,” then accommodation is required.  As Professor Witte observed, this test 
“served to draw together the classic principles of liberty of conscience, free exercise, 
equality, pluralism, and separationism, and to accord free exercise protection to both 
                                                                                                     
 81.  See Michael W. McConnell, Accommodation of Religion: An Update and a Response to the 
Critics, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV 685, 686 (1992).   
 82.  See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1414–15 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, The Origins].  There is also 
a second aspect to the debate: whether legislative accommodations are a constitutionally permissible 
means of protecting religious freedom.  Id. at 1415.  In his seminal study of the history of the federal 
Free Exercise Clause, Professor Michael McConnell, a former judge on the United States Court of 
Appeals of the Tenth Circuit, concluded that “[t]here is no substantial evidence that [religious] 
exemptions were considered constitutionally questionable.” Id. at 1511.  This Article focuses on whether 
or not Maine’s free exercise clause mandates certain accommodations of religion, not on the 
constitutionality of legislative accommodations of religion.   
 83.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-29 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-
08 (1963). 
 84.  See Richard W. Garnett & Joshua D. Dunlap, Taking Accommodation Seriously: Religious 
Freedom and the O Centro Case, 2005–06 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 257, 260-66 (2006) (discussing the 
Sherbert, Yoder, and Smith cases). 
 85.  See John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American 
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 371, 414–18 (1996) (discussing Sherbert, Yoder 
and other Supreme Court cases applying the compelling interest test). 
 86.  See Yoder, 405 U.S. at 214-15. 
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religious individuals and religious groups”87 through accommodations of religion.  
In doing so, this test “served to mold the free exercise clause into a . . . delicate and 
flexible instrument that could counter both overt and covert forms of religious 
discrimination.”88 
In Sherbert and Yoder, the Supreme Court affirmed that religious believers were 
entitled to accommodations of their religion.  In Sherbert, the Supreme Court held 
that it was unconstitutional to deny a Seventh Day Adventist unemployment 
compensation benefits because of her refusal to work on Saturday for religious 
reasons.89  The Court concluded that “condition[ing] the availability of benefits upon 
[an individual’s] willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith 
effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties.”90  It also found 
that the law was not justified by any compelling state interest.91  In Yoder, the 
Supreme Court held that the Amish should be exempted from compulsory school-
attendance laws because those laws violated their sincere religious beliefs.92  The 
Court concluded that Wisconsin’s “requirement of compulsory formal education . . . 
would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious 
beliefs.”93  It went on to conclude that the law did not serve a compelling state 
interest, in the context of the facts before it.94   
b. Smith 
 A sea-change in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence occurred in 1990.  That 
year, in Smith, the Supreme Court decided a case involving a challenge by Alfred 
Smith, a member of the Native American Church, to the denial of unemployment 
compensation based on his sacramental use of peyote, a controlled substance.95  The 
Supreme Court rejected Smith’s argument that he had been deprived of his free 
exercise rights and, in so doing, did away with constitutionally mandated 
accommodations.96  According to Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, “the right of 
free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid 
and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or 
prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).’”97  The Supreme 
Court distinguished Yoder as a “hybrid” rights case that succeeded only because the 
free exercise claim was buttressed by other constitutional claims.98  The Court 
distinguished Sherbert as “stand[ing] for the proposition that where the State has in 
place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to 
                                                                                                     
 87.  Witte, supra note 85, at 414. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399-402 (1963). 
 90.  Id. at 406. 
 91.  See id. at 406–07. 
 92.  See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207-13 (1972). 
 93.  See id. at 219. 
 94.  See id. at 221-29. 
 95.  Emp. Div., Dep’t. of Hum. Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 874-76 (1990). 
 96.  Id. at 879-82. 
 97.  Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
 98.  Id. at 881-82. 
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cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling reason.”99  Under the new Smith 
standard, the salient question is whether a law is truly neutral and generally 
applicable.100  Neutral laws of general applicability “must prevail—regardless of the 
nature of the state’s interest and regardless of any intrusion on the interest of a 
religious believer or body.”101 
c. The Response to Smith 
The response to Smith among legal commentators has been aptly described as 
“thunderous.”102  Some defend Smith, even though its defenders often questioned its 
rationale.103  Most scholars, however, criticize Smith.104  These scholars contest 
Justice Scalia’s textual and historical analysis, as well as the use of precedent in 
Smith.105  Scholars also criticize Smith as leaving religious individuals and groups 
exposed to the “crushing” weight of generally applicable laws that “ignore an entire 
dimension of human activity and meaning.”106  Some of these scholars propose that 
the Supreme Court reexamine its decision in Smith and recognize that “the Free 
Exercise Clause, by its very terms and read in the light of its historic purposes, 
guarantees that believers of every faith, and not just the majority, are able to practice 
their religion without unnecessary interference from the government.”107  Others 
propose another approach—namely, restoring a more active scrutiny of free exercise 
                                                                                                     
 99.  Id. at 884 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)).  
 100.  Under Smith, the Supreme Court will invalidate as unconstitutional a law that “targets” religion 
by discriminating against religious practices or that is not “generally applicable” because it is 
underinclusive with regard to the state’s asserted interests—unless the law survives the compelling 
interest test.  Id. at 879; see Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
533-46 (1993).   
 101.  Witte, supra note 85, at 420. 
 102.  Daniel A. Crane, Beyond RFRA: Free Exercise of Religion Comes of Age in the State Courts, 
10 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 235, 236 (1998).  The details of this extensive debate are beyond the scope of 
this article. 
 103.  See, e.g., Philip A. Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Historical 
Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 915 (1992); Gerard V. Bradley, Beguiled: Free Exercise 
Exemptions and the Siren Song of Liberalism, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 245 (1991). 
 104.  See, e.g., David E. Steinberg, Rejecting the Case Against the Free Exercise Exemption: A 
Critical Assessment, 75 B.U. L. REV. 241 (1995); James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the 
Mountaintop, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 91 (1991); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 
SUP. CT. REV. 1 (1990); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990) [hereinafter McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism]. 
 105.  McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 104, at 1114-28.   
 106.  Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An Emerging Post-
Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, 278 (1993). 
 107.  McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism, supra note 104, at 1152.  At least four justices have 
seemingly indicated an openness to revisiting Smith.  See Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 139 S. Ct. 
634, 637 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (observing that the case potentially raised 
free exercise issues but that the petitioner had not asked the Court to “revisit” Smith).  The Supreme 
Court may take up this question in the October 2020 term.  See Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 140 S. Ct. 
1104 (2020) (mem.) (granting petition for certiorari).  Although the Supreme Court has not yet revisited 
Smith as of this writing, Congress—with massive bipartisan support—adopted the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act (“RFRA”), which codified the Sherbert and Yoder compelling interest test. See Garnett 
& Dunlap, supra note 84, at 258, 268-69.  RFRA, however, only applies to challenges to federal law, 
not state law.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (concluding that RFRA exceeded 
the scope of Congress’ power under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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claims under state constitutions.108   
This latter call did not go entirely unheeded.  Likely because of the scholarly 
debate regarding the propriety of constitutionally mandated exemptions under the 
First Amendment, “Smith forced a useful reexamination by states and state courts of 
their own constitutions,” specifically, “what liberties and values do . . . state 
constitutions—which are organic, constitutive documents—protect?”109  Very 
quickly after the Supreme Court’s Smith decision, state courts began to examine 
anew the guarantees to free exercise of religion contained in their own state 
constitutions.110  Some states have chosen to forego an independent approach.111  At 
least ten states, however, have declined to follow Smith and continue to find 
accommodations to be constitutionally mandated.112 
Maine’s closest neighbors illustrate this divergent response.  Although both New 
Hampshire and Massachusetts have free exercise clauses similar to the one contained 
in Maine’s Declaration of Rights,113 New Hampshire has followed Smith while 
Massachusetts has interpreted its constitution as having separate vitality.114  For its 
part, New Hampshire has expressly relied upon Smith in denying a free exercise 
claim brought under the state constitution by a defendant seeking to modify his 
probation conditions.  Without analyzing the text or history of the state constitution 
at all, New Hampshire’s Supreme Court reasoned that the free exercise claim must 
fail because the probation condition was “facially neutral.”115  Massachusetts has 
followed a different course.  In a case involving a free exercise challenge to a state 
statute prohibiting discrimination on account of marital status, the Massachusetts 
Supreme Judicial Court noted that it should “reach its own conclusions on the scope 
                                                                                                     
 108.  See, e.g., Carmella, supra note 106, at 279. 
 109.  Piero A. Tozzi, Whither Free Exercise: Employment Division v. Smith and the Rebirth of State 
Constitutional Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence, 48 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 269, 276 (2009). 
 110.  Christine Durham, What Goes Around Comes Around: The New Relevancy of State 
Constitution Religion Clauses, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 353, 365-66 (2004); Crane, supra note 102, at 244-
51; see Tracey Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of Their 
Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1017, 1032-49 
(1994). 
 111.  Linton, supra note 14, at 186. 
 112.  Id.; see Witte, supra note 85, at 374-75. 
 113.  The New Hampshire Constitution is very similar to that of Maine.  Article V of the New 
Hampshire Declaration of Rights states:  “Every individual has a natural and unalienable right to 
worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and reason; and no subject shall be hurt, 
molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the manner and season 
most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession, sentiments, or 
persuasion; provided he doth not disturb the public peace or disturb others in their religious worship.”  
N.H. CONST., pt. I, art. V.  Massachusetts has two free exercise provisions—Article 2 of the Declaration 
of Rights (“Article 2”) and Article 46, Section 1 of the amendments to the state constitution (“Article 
46”).  See Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235, 241 (Mass. 1994).  The text of Article 46 is 
similar to the text of the First Amendment.  See MASS. CONST. amend. art. 46 § 1.  Article 2 is similar to 
Section 3 of Maine’s Declaration of Rights.  See MASS. CONST., pt. II, art. II (stating, in part: “[N]o 
subject shall be hurt, molested, or restrained, in his person, liberty, or estate, for worshipping God in the 
manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of his own conscience; or for his religious profession 
or sentiments; provided he doth not disturb the public peace, or obstruct others in their religious 
worship”).   
 114.  See Linton, supra note 14, at 137-44, 159. 
 115.  State v. Perfetto, 7 A.3d 1179, 1182-83 (N.H. 2010). 
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of the protections” afforded under the state constitution “and should not necessarily 
follow the reasoning adopted by the Supreme Court . . . under the First 
Amendment.”116  Relying primarily on its own precedent applying the compelling 
interest test, the court chose to “adhere to the standards of [its] earlier . . . 
jurisprudence.”117   
In sum, following Smith, academic and judicial approaches to free exercise have 
fractured.  It remains uncertain whether a consistent line of state cases will ultimately 
reinvigorate the protections that were rolled back by Smith.118  There is no question, 
however, that the divergence of scholarly and judicial analysis has provided fertile 
ground for independent analysis of state constitutions.   
2. A More Stable Maine Free Exercise Clause Jurisprudence 
It is in this context that the Maine Law Court’s free exercise jurisprudence has 
developed.  The Law Court adopted the pre-Smith analysis as a matter of Maine law 
in its 1988 Blount decision.119  The court has adhered to that analysis even after the 
Supreme Court’s departure from it, as can be seen in a series of cases culminating in 
Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland.120  As Professor Tinkle has observed, 
“[i]n the area of free exercise of religion, state and federal law have diverged.”121  By 
maintaining continuity in its approach to Article I, Section 3 before and after Smith, 
the Law Court has provided analytical stability, which is lacking under federal law, 
and has maintained the availability of constitutionally mandated accommodations of 
religion as a matter of state law.   
a. Blount v. Department of Educational and Cultural Services 
In Blount v. Department of Educational and Cultural Services, the Law Court 
adopted an interpretation of Article I, Section 3 that coincided with the free exercise 
analysis used by the Supreme Court in Sherbert and Yoder.122  In Blount, parents 
                                                                                                     
 116.  Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 235. 
 117.  Id. at 236-41; see Magazu v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 42 N.E.3d 1107, 1117 n.10 (Mass. 
2016).  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court has interpreted the two free exercise provisions in its 
constitution as providing distinct and separate protections.  See id. at 236-37, 242-43.  Its holding 
rejecting Smith came in the context of Article 46 rather than Article 2.  See Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 235 
(rejecting Smith despite textual similarity between Article 46 and the First Amendment).  Somewhat 
ironically, therefore, Massachusetts departed from Smith in interpreting a text similar to the First 
Amendment, while the New Hampshire Supreme Court followed Smith in interpreting a very different 
text.  Massachusetts’ treatment of Article 2 is discussed further infra, at Part II(B)(2). 
 118.  See Stanley H. Friedelbaum, Free Exercise in the States: Belief, Conduct, and Judicial 
Benchmarks, 63 ALB. L. REV. 1059, 1066-67 (2000). 
 119.  Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1379, 1385 (Me. 1988). 
 120.  See infra Part II(A)(2)(d); Fortin v. Roman Cath. Bishop of Portland, 2005 ME 57, 871 A.2d 
1208. 
 121.  TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 31; see Linton, supra note 14, at 
134 (noting that the Maine Law Court “has departed from the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Free 
Exercise Clause as set forth in Employment Division v. Smith, preferring, instead, to adhere to the pre-
Smith jurisprudence”); Crane, supra note 102, at 245, 249 (noting that the Maine Law Court has 
continued to apply heightened scrutiny even after Smith). 
 122.  See TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 31-32; Linton, supra note 14, 
at 134-35. 
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brought suit challenging a state regulation requiring them to obtain prior approval of 
the home schooling instruction they provided to their children.123  Among other 
claims, the parents brought a free exercise challenge under both the United States 
and Maine Constitutions.124   
In the context of the federal free exercise challenge, the Law Court applied “a 
four-stage framework” under the Free Exercise Clause.125  Citing Yoder, the Law 
Court concluded that a person challenging a government regulation as a violation of 
the Free Exercise Clause bears the burden of showing:  “1) that the activity burdened 
by the regulation is motivated by a sincerely held religious belief; and 2) that the 
challenged regulation constrains the free exercise of that religious belief.”126  If the 
challenger makes these showings, the state must prove both “3) that the challenged 
regulation is motivated by a compelling public interest; and 4) that no less restrictive 
means can adequately achieve that compelling public interest.”127  The court found 
that the parents had established that the state law substantially burdened their 
religious beliefs.  The court also concluded, however, that the State’s interest in 
ensuring a quality education for children was “so essential that the [parents’] loss in 
[religious] freedom [was] clearly outweighed by the benefit,” even though religious 
liberty itself is a “compelling public interest[].”128  Finally, the court found that the 
regulation was the least restrictive means of furthering the State’s interests.129   
The Law Court then turned to the parents’ claim under the Maine Constitution, 
using the same four-part framework.  The court—perhaps loosely following a 
parallelism approach130— “conclude[d] that the full range of protection afforded the 
[parents] by the Maine Constitution is also available under the United States 
Constitution.”131  In the court’s view, the parents’ state claim relied on the premise 
that the Maine Constitution “provides more protection for religious practice and less 
protection for countervailing public interests than does the” First Amendment, as 
interpreted in Yoder.132  The court rejected this premise for two reasons.  First, the 
Maine Constitution, which specifically provides that a person’s religious freedom 
may be curtailed for certain enumerated reasons, could not “be read as giving less 
weight to ‘compelling public interests’ than does the unqualified language of the 
                                                                                                     
 123.  Blount, 551 A.2d at 1378-79. 
 124.  Id. at 1379, 1385. 
 125.  Id. at 1379. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  Id. 
 128.  Id. at 1381. 
 129.  Id. at 1379-85. 
 130.  The Law Court did not fully explain its reasons for adopting the Sherbert/Yoder test in Blount 
and some of its language suggests a parallelism approach.  Accordingly, it is difficult to determine 
whether the Law Court adopted the Sherbert/Yoder test through independent analysis (consistent with 
the primacy approach) or by conflating Section 3 with the First Amendment (consistent with the 
parallelism approach).  The lack of clarity on this point is ultimately irrelevant because the Law Court 
later applied the primacy approach in Fortin. 
 131.  Blount, 551 A.2d at 1385.  This was not the first time that the Law Court relied on the Sherbert 
formulation.  See Dotter v. Me. Emp. Sec. Comm’n, 435 A.2d 1368, 1372-74 (Me. 1981); Osier v. 
Osier, 410 A.2d 1027, 1030-31 (Me. 1980).  In Blount, however, the Court tied it to the Maine 
Constitution.   
 132.  Blount, 551 A.2d at 1385. 
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First Amendment forbidding any ‘law . . . prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’”133  
Further, the Law Court observed that the framers of the Maine Constitution had “laid 
upon the legislature . . . the obligation to see that suitable provision is made for the 
support and maintenance of public schools” in a section that “has no federal 
counterpart.”134  The court thus rejected the state claim.  Nevertheless, the Law 
Court’s Blount test—which incorporated the Supreme Court’s familiar 
Sherbert/Yoder analysis—would define the Law Court’s free exercise jurisprudence 
going forward.  
b. Rupert v. City of Portland 
Two years after the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith, the Law Court declined 
to revisit the free exercise test it had adopted in Blount.135  In Rupert v. City of 
Portland, the Law Court’s first post-Smith free exercise case, the court considered a 
claim that state drug laws infringed upon religious freedom.136  The court held that 
Blount was “controlling authority . . . so far as the Maine Constitution [was] 
concerned.”137  Because the court concluded that Maine had a compelling public 
interest in preventing the distribution and use of illegal drugs and that the law was 
the least restrictive means of accomplishing that compelling purpose, the court stated 
that it had “no reason . . . to decide” whether—in interpreting Section 3—it would 
“change course to follow the Supreme Court’s lead in Smith.”138  Although the Law 
Court declined to decide this issue, its choice to apply the Blount test in a case that 
closely paralleled Smith foreshadowed its later departure from the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence.139  
c. Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland 
Following its decision in Rupert, the Law Court again signaled its continued 
adherence to the Blount balancing test in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of 
Portland—albeit in a different context.140  In Swanson, a husband and wife brought 
an action against a priest and the Catholic Church as a result of the priest’s alleged 
sexual liaison with the wife, asserting claims against the priest for infliction of 
emotional distress and against the church for negligent supervision.141  After the 
church moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on constitutional grounds, the 
Superior Court granted the motion in part and reported the case to the Law Court for 
interlocutory review pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 72(c).142  The legal 
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issue presented to the Law Court was whether a negligent supervision claim against 
a church could survive under the federal and state constitutions.143   
Without distinguishing between the federal and state free exercise provisions, 
the Law Court relied upon the well-established rule that courts may only adjudicate 
church-related disputes that can be resolved by neutral principles without 
consideration of church doctrine.144  The court concluded that a claim of negligent 
supervision would likely require an examination of church doctrine regarding how it 
governs its clergy and infringe upon the ecclesiastical relationship between the 
church and its pastoral staff. 145  Although it did not directly cite Blount, the court 
echoed its balancing test by concluding that “imposing a secular duty of supervision 
on the church and enforcing that duty through civil liability would restrict its freedom 
to interact with its clergy in the manner deemed proper by ecclesiastical authorities 
and would not serve a societal interest sufficient to overcome the religious freedom 
inhibited.”146  In so stating, the court implicitly reaffirmed the compelling interest 
test and signaled its hesitance to follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith.147  
But again, in Swanson, the Law Court did not speak definitively regarding Smith.   
d. Fortin v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland 
The Law Court was not presented with an opportunity to directly consider the 
post-Smith vitality of its Blount formulation until 2005.148  Once given that 
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 148.  While the Law Court reviewed a free exercise challenge to Maine’s tuition program in 1999, 
the parties to that case did “not contend that the Maine Constitution affords greater protection than the 
United States Constitution.”  The Court therefore proceeded “with the understanding that the rights 
guaranteed by the United States Constitution and the Maine Constitution are coextensive.”  Bagley v. 
Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 13, 728 A.2d 127.  The court applied the Blount test, noting that 
the law at issue was not “neutral on its face” and was thus subject to the compelling interest test even 
after Smith.  Id. ¶ 16 n.10; see also Linton, supra note 14, at 135. 
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opportunity, the court “indicated that the Blount analysis applied under the Maine 
Constitution and was more rigorous than the US Supreme Court’s current test under 
the Federal Constitution’s free exercise clause.”149  Specifically, in Fortin v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Portland, the court reviewed an appeal of the Superior Court’s 
decision to grant the church’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary 
duty and negligent supervision claims against the church arising from allegations of 
sexual abuse.150  The Law Court reversed, concluding that the complaint stated 
sufficient facts to survive dismissal.151  The court took up, and ultimately rejected, 
the church’s argument that a recognition of a fiduciary relationship would 
“necessarily infringe on its free exercise of religion in violation of the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 3 of the Maine 
Constitution.”152   
In analyzing the First Amendment defense, the Law Court applied the Smith test, 
noting that a neutral, generally applicable law that does not have the “object” of 
prohibiting the exercise of religion does not violate the Free Exercise Clause.153  The 
court observed, however, that the question of whether a law is “neutral” is one that 
itself remained somewhat unsettled.  The Law Court took note of the debate over 
whether a law must only be formally neutral (i.e., a law that does not have as its 
object discrimination against religion) or whether a law must also be substantively 
neutral (i.e., a law that does not burden religious individuals more than it burdens 
others).154  The court declined to weigh in on this dispute, finding that the First 
Amendment defense failed under either approach because the church did not 
“identify a specific religious doctrine or practice that will be burdened if [the 
plaintiff’s] claim is not dismissed.”155   
The Law Court then separately took up the defense raised under Section 3 of the 
Declaration of Rights, noting that the church had argued that “Article I, Section 3 of 
the Maine Constitution is more protective of religious liberty than is the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.”156  The court observed that the church was 
“correct that Blount’s and Rupert’s formulation of the standard applied to free 
exercise claims” was “akin to the more rigorous standard” in Yoder.157  The court 
went on to note that it had, in Rupert, “expressly acknowledged that [it] w[as] not 
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adopting the U.S. Supreme Court’s then recent holding in Smith as part of [the 
Court’s] Article I, Section 3 analysis.”158  It also observed that, in Swanson, it—while 
“not expressly employ[ing] the Blount analysis”—had reaffirmed “the necessity of 
balancing the societal interests and the associated infringement on the free exercise 
of religion.”159  Accordingly, utilizing the primacy approach to constitutional 
interpretation, the court applied the Blount test in analyzing Article I, Section 3.160  
The court ultimately rejected the church’s arguments because the church was not 
able to show that the claim would cause the court to burden the free exercise of 
religion by, for instance, delving into doctrinal matters.161  The Fortin decision, 
however, made it clear that the Law Court saw Section 3 as providing greater 
protection than that afforded under Smith.162   
e. Summary 
The Law Court’s jurisprudence from Blount to Fortin establishes that Section 3 
of the Declaration of Rights provides the same protections that the First Amendment 
was understood to provide prior to Smith.  In Blount, the Law Court endorsed the 
availability of constitutionally-mandated exemptions, thereby rejecting the notion 
that neutral, generally applicable laws necessarily pass muster under Section 3.163  
Blount established that Section 3 was co-extensive with the First Amendment as 
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induce by judicial means changes in Catholic teaching.  See Richard W. Garnett, Assimilation, 
Toleration, and the State’s Interest in the Development of Religious Doctrine, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1645, 
1679, n.165 (2004).  Donahoe’s anti-Catholic context provides some explanation for the decision’s 
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See Wesley J. Campbell, Note, A New Approach to Nineteenth-Century Religious Exemption Cases, 63 
STAN. L. REV. 973, 990-1001 (2011) (contrasting Donahoe with prior exemption cases and noting that it 
marked “a clear departure from their logic and scope”).  Donahoe is more a remnant of political 
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favor of an interpretation of Section 3 that is supported by the text and history of the Declaration of 
Rights.  See infra Part II(B). 
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interpreted by Sherbert and Yoder—not necessarily because the state free exercise 
clause must be interpreted to mean the same thing as its federal counterpart, but rather 
because it should be so interpreted.  In later cases, the Law Court indicated that 
Blount had retained its vitality.  In Fortin, the Law Court again endorsed the Blount 
test and made known its disagreement with Smith.  In so doing, the Law Court 
necessarily reaffirmed both the primacy approach and its view that Section 3 of the 
Declaration of Rights contains more expansive protections than are provided under 
the First Amendment after Smith.   
B. Textual Analysis of Article I, Section 3  
The text of Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights strongly supports the Law 
Court’s decision to chart an independent course after Smith.  The language used by 
the framers in Section 3 is consistent with the Law Court’s Blount test and the 
availability of constitutionally mandated accommodations of religion.  By setting 
forth a clause guaranteeing religious liberty, a proviso ensuring that religious liberty 
claims are not permitted to disturb the public peace or religious liberties of others, 
and a separate clause guaranteeing equal protection, Section 3 makes it clear that the 
Maine Constitution does more than prevent religious discrimination.  Instead, it 
expressly contemplates exemptions from generally applicable laws for religious 
believers, subject only to the most compelling of state interests. 
1. The Text: Different than the First Amendment 
Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights is worded differently than its federal 
counterpart in the First Amendment.  This simple fact is of critical salience.  In 
interpreting the Maine Constitution, state courts must “look primarily to the language 
used.”164  Accordingly, different words used in one constitutional text than another 
may lead a court to conclude that the scope of the rights guaranteed by that text is 
different from the scope of the rights guaranteed by the other.   
In the context of the federal and state Religion Clauses, the constitutional 
language is significantly different.  The familiar words of the Religion Clauses of the 
First Amendment are succinct:  “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”165  Section 3 of 
the Declaration of Rights, by contrast, is far lengthier: 
All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God 
according to the dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall be hurt, 
molested or restrained in that person’s liberty or estate for worshipping God in the 
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manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of that person’s own conscience, 
nor for that person’s religious professions or sentiments, provided that that person 
does not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their religious worship—
and all persons demeaning themselves peaceably, as good members of the State, 
shall be equally under the protection of the laws, and no subordination nor 
preference of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be established by 
law, nor shall any religious test be required as a qualification for any office or trust, 
under this State; and all religious societies in this State, whether incorporate or 
unincorporate, shall at all times have the exclusive right of electing their public 
teachers, and contracting with them for their support and maintenance.166 
A close analysis of Section 3 of Maine’s Declaration of Rights demonstrates that the 
provision is considerably more specific than the First Amendment. 
Section 3 consists of several constituent parts.  First, and of most pertinence to 
this Article, is the free exercise clause.167  This clause sets out the basic principle that 
every individual has the unalienable right to worship God according to his or her 
conscience, and that no individual’s liberty may be curtailed as the result of the 
exercise of this right.  The free exercise clause also contains a proviso limiting the 
scope of religious liberty by precluding religious believers from asserting a right to 
disturb the public peace or inhibit the religious liberties of others.  Second, Section 
3 contains an equal protection clause, requiring that individuals be provided the equal 
protection of the laws regardless of their religious beliefs and practices.168  Third, 
Section 3 contains an establishment clause prohibiting legal recognition of any 
particular religious denomination.169  Fourth, Section 3 contains a religious test 
clause.170  This provision prohibits the establishment of any religious test for public 
office.  Fifth, Section 3 contains a ministerial exception clause preventing the state 
from interfering with a religious institution’s choice of its teachers.171   
The very specific language of Section 3 does not necessarily mean that the 
framers chose to provide restraints on state government more extensive than the 
restraints already placed on the federal government by the First Amendment.  For 
example, while the First Amendment does not contain separate clauses guaranteeing 
equal protection and prohibiting government intervention in the hiring practices of 
religious institutions, the First Amendment can—and should—be read to address 
these issues.  The Supreme Court, for instance, has held that laws “may not single 
out the religious for disfavored treatment,” and has struck down discriminatory 
                                                                                                     
 166.  ME. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 167.  “All individuals have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according to the 
dictates of their own consciences, and no person shall be hurt, molested or restrained in that person’s 
liberty or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of that 
person’s own conscience, nor for that person’s religious professions or sentiments, provided that that 
person does not disturb the public peace, nor obstruct others in their religious worship . . . .”  Id.  
 168.  “[A]ll persons demeaning themselves peaceably, as good members of the State, shall be equally 
under the protection of the laws, . . . .”  Id. 
 169.  “[N]o subordination nor preference of any one sect or denomination to another shall ever be 
established by law. . . .”  Id. 
 170.  “[N]or shall any religious test be required as a qualification for any office or trust, under this 
State; . . . .”  Id. 
 171.  “[A]ll religious societies in this State, whether incorporate or unincorporate, shall at all times 
have the exclusive right of electing their public teachers, and contracting with them for their support and 
maintenance.”  Id. 
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schemes disfavoring religious entities and believers.172  The Supreme Court has also 
held that the First Amendment does indeed prohibit the government from interfering 
in certain employment decisions by religious institutions.173  Even as to the issue of 
constitutionally mandated exemptions, there is strong historical evidence that the 
First Amendment was originally understood to require accommodations of 
religion—contrary to Smith.174 
The text of Section 3 does demonstrate, however, that the framers chose to 
delineate the various aspects of religious liberty more precisely than the First 
Amendment.  Thus, to use two examples just considered, the framers chose to 
explicitly state that religious liberty includes an equal protection guarantee as well 
as a ministerial exception.  The benefits of having enumerated the different aspects 
of religious liberty are significant.  In the context of ministerial exception claims, for 
example, the specificity of the Maine Constitution ensured that courts recognized 
protections for religious institutions as a matter of state law long before the Supreme 
Court addressed the existence of the ministerial exception as a matter of federal 
law.175  In the context of constitutionally mandated accommodation of religion, the 
specificity of Section 3 short-circuits the debate over Smith.  The framers’ choice of 
language means that, unlike the First Amendment, the existence of mandatory 
exemptions does not have to be determined based on the principles underlying a 
sparse text or historical evidence regarding that text’s original meaning (as 
compelling as such principles or evidence might be).  Instead, it can be determined 
based on the text of Section 3.   
2. The Text: A Balancing Test 
In addition to guaranteeing equal protection and providing a safe harbor for 
                                                                                                     
 172.  Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2020-25 (2017); see 
Espinoza v.  Montana Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2255-57 (2020).  Equal protection, in fact, 
forms the core of the First Amendment’s protection of free exercise after Smith.  See Trinity Lutheran, 
137 S. Ct. at 2020-21.  Even if the Free Exercise Clause should be read to encompass more than an 
equal protection principle, there is sound reason to conclude that equal protection of religious 
individuals and groups is an important element of the First Amendment’s guarantee of religious liberty.  
See, e.g., Steven G. Calabresi & Abe Salander, Religion and the Equal Protection Clause: Why the 
Constitution Requires School Vouchers, 65 FLA. L. REV. 909, 965-66 (2013) (“The Religion Clauses of 
the original Constitution and of the federal Bill of Rights were . . . consistent with the Lockean principle 
of allowing only general rules applicable to all religions only on similar terms.”); Witte, supra note 85, 
at 398-99. 
 173.  Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 188-89 (2012).  
This conclusion is supported by the history of the First Amendment.  See Dunlap, supra note 147, at 
2015-25 (discussing the historical justification for the ministerial exception under the First 
Amendment). 
 174.  Professor McConnell, who conducted perhaps the most extensive historical study of the Free 
Exercise Clause and constitutionally-mandated accommodations of religion, concluded that the 
“doctrine of free exercise exemptions is more consistent with the original understanding than is a 
position that leads only to the facial neutrality of legislation.”  McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, 
at 1512.  But cf. Hamburger, supra note 103, at 947-48. 
 175.  Courts recognized the ministerial exception under the Maine Constitution decades prior to the 
Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in Hosanna-Tabor.  See Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 188-89; Graffam 
v. Wray, 437 A.3d 627, 635 n.11 (Me. 1981) (citing Master v. Second Parish of Portland, 36 F. Supp. 
918, 926 (D. Me. 1940), aff’d, 124 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1941)). 
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religious institutions’ right to choose their ministers, the framers of the Maine 
Constitution expressly adopted protections for the free exercise of religion that 
balanced the burden placed on free exercise against the state interests justifying that 
burden.  Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights defines both the scope of free exercise 
and its limits.176  It expressly acknowledges that religious liberty protects not only 
beliefs but also conduct.  It also recognizes, however, that a limited set of state 
interests, such as the interest in public peace and safety, may prevail over a claim of 
religious liberty.  The framers thus built into the text a balancing test—comparable 
to the Sherbert and Yoder test—that contemplates constitutionally mandated 
accommodations.  The text of Section 3 provides no basis for concluding that neutral, 
generally applicable laws that substantially burden the free exercise of religion are 
constitutional, absent some compelling state interest.   
a. The Scope of Religious Liberty: Belief and Conduct  
The free exercise clause of Section 3 defines religious liberty broadly.  It protects 
all individuals’ “natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God according 
to the dictates of their own consciences” and prohibits restrictions on any “person’s 
liberty or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to the 
dictates of that person’s own conscience, nor for that person’s religious professions 
or sentiments.”177   
Under the language of Section 3, religious freedom encompasses both practices 
and beliefs.178  The phrase “no person shall be hurt, molested or restrained in that 
person’s liberty or estate for worshipping God in the manner and season most 
agreeable to the dictates of that person’s own conscience” protects actions while the 
phrase “nor for that person’s religious professions or sentiments” protects religious 
beliefs.179  Thus, as Professor McConnell has explained, the language used in the 
Maine Constitution—as with the text of its sister constitutions in Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire—defines the scope of free exercise “in terms of the conscience of 
the individual believer and the actions that flow from that conscience.”180  To read 
the free exercise clause of Section 3 as protecting only beliefs would render the first 
of these two phrases meaningless, contrary to canons of constitutional 
interpretation.181   
                                                                                                     
 176.  Professor McConnell has helpfully explored both the scope and the limitations of similar free 
exercise clauses contained in early state constitutions.  See McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 
1455-66. 
 177.  ME. CONST. art. I, § 3. 
 178.  McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1459.     
 179.  See Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 242 (Mass. 1994) (the reference in Article 2 of 
Massachusetts’ Declaration of Rights to “worshipping God in the manner and season most agreeable to 
the dictates of his own conscience” refers to and protects “conduct,” while the reference to “religious 
profession or sentiments” protects “religious beliefs”).   
 180.  McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1458-59; see id. at 1451-52 (noting that, in colonial 
America, it was well accepted that liberty of conscience was widely understood to include actions 
compelled by conscience:  “there could be no such thing as freedom of conscience without freedom to 
act”). 
 181.  See Op. of the Justices, 673 A.2d 1291, 1297 (Me. 1996) (declining to adopt constitutional 
interpretation that would render a provision meaningless).  The broad scope of Section 3, protecting not 
only beliefs but also conduct motivated by “the dictates of [each] person’s own conscience,” is 
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While Section 3 does not define the precise scope of the actions or conduct 
protected, there is no reason to conclude that the use of the term “worship” indicates 
that religious freedom is limited to protecting the rituals or ceremonial acts of 
religion that occur within the four walls of a church building or other house of 
worship.  The language of Section 3 contains no suggestion that “worship” refers 
solely to ceremonial acts; to the contrary, it protects the right of every individual to 
worship according “to the dictates of that person’s own conscience.”  This language 
unambiguously establishes that every individual is free to decide what that worship 
entails.182  Further, as Professor McConnell notes, the understanding of the term 
“worship,” in the Protestant view dominant during early American history, is 
generally indistinguishable “from ‘the duty we owe to our Creator.’”183  In the 
Protestant tradition, “‘duties’ to God included actions, perhaps all of life, and not just 
speech and opinion.”184  “Worship” is, therefore, any act that is motivated by one’s 
religious beliefs.  Unsurprisingly, then, “[i]n none of the state free exercise cases in 
the early years of the Republic did the lawyers argue or the courts hold that 
religiously motivated conduct was unprotected because it was not ‘worship.’”185  It 
is for good reason that Maine courts have never so limited the scope of Section 3.186 
b. The Countervailing Interests: Peace or Obstruction   
The language of Section 3 strikes a clear constitutional balance between 
                                                                                                     
consistent with the notion that the “right of free exercise precedes and is superior to” civil obligations.  
McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1459.  This theory of religious liberty is discussed further in 
Part II(C)(1). 
 182.  See Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 243-44 (Liacos, C.J., concurring).  Indeed, an attempt to distinguish 
between what is or is not worship would necessarily entangle courts in inherently religious questions.  
Id. at 244 (“The decision by an individual as to what form of religious worship constitutes an 
appropriate vehicle by which to pay homage to a chosen object of that worship can hardly be 
characterized as anything but a religious belief or sentiment, for it is religious belief which informs, and 
serves as the foundation for, that choice.  Accordingly, if . . . any court purports to consider whether a 
practice is truly a form of worship, then in essence the court is inquiring into the validity of a religious 
belief.  No civil court, however, may make such an inquiry.”).  The Law Court has signaled its hesitance 
to engage in such analysis.  See Bagley v. Raymond Sch. Dep’t, 1999 ME 60, ¶ 18, 728 A.2d 127 
(noting that courts “should be hesitant to delve into the asserted ‘centrality’ of a religious practice” to an 
individual’s beliefs). 
 183.  McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1460 (quoting R. MEHL, THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
PROTESTANTISM 107-08 (J. Farley trans. 1970)).  
 184.  Id. at 1459.   
 185.  Id. at 1461.   
 186.  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, by contrast, has limited that state’s corollary to 
Section 3 by drawing a distinction between “the ritual and ceremonial aspects of worship” and “conduct 
motivated by sincerely held religious convictions.”  Soc’y of Jesus of New Eng. v. Commonwealth, 808 
N.E.2d 272, 284-85, 284 n.15 (Mass. 2004) (quoting Att’y Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237 
(1994)).  The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court adopted this distinction in an attempt to avoid 
conflating Article 2 with Article 46, both of which protect free exercise rights.  Id. at 284 (“[I]f all 
actions taken based on religious belief qualified as ‘worship[]’ under art. 2, the free exercise clause of 
art. 46, § 1, would be superfluous.”).  The court did not undertake any analysis of the original 
understanding of Article 2 or the reasons for the (much later) adoption of Article 46.  Id. at 279-82, 284-
85.  In any event, Maine has no provision similar to Article 46, and thus there is no need to harmonize 
what may well be—in the unique context of the Massachusetts Constitution—two overlapping 
provisions. 
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religious liberty and the rightful exercise of civil authority by stating that the free 
exercise of religion is limited by—or, phrased another way, may only be outweighed 
by—specified state interests.  Section 3 expressly states that the free exercise of 
religion may be restricted only if it would “disturb the public peace” or “obstruct 
others in their religious worship.”187  By juxtaposing religious liberty against the 
state’s interest in preserving “public peace” and protecting the religious liberty of 
others, this proviso serves two purposes:  confirming the breadth of the protections 
under Section 3 and delineating the bounds of free exercise by providing that 
compelling state interests may limit religious liberty.   
The proviso both confirms that Section 3 protects religious conduct and also 
establishes that Section 3 mandates accommodation of religion even in the context 
of generally applicable laws.  As to the first of these points, the proviso “confirm[s] 
that the free exercise right was not understood to be confined to beliefs,” as “[b]eliefs 
without more do not have the capacity to disturb the public peace and safety.”188  As 
to the second of these points, the proviso confirms that Section 3 “envisions 
religiously compelled exemptions from at least some generally applicable laws.”189  
If Section 3 did no more than create a Smith-like nondiscrimination principle, then 
there would be no question that a religious believer is prohibited from engaging in 
actions inconsistent with the public peace as outlined by neutral, generally applicable 
state laws.190  “In a regime where all generally applicable laws are enforced even 
against contrary religious conscience, there is no need to specify that the right” is 
limited by the state’s interest in preserving the peace—in short, no need for the 
proviso.191  It would be superfluous to expressly limit the constitutional protection 
afforded religious conduct that would breach the peace unless Section 3 mandated 
exemptions to some generally applicable laws. 
The proviso also establishes that religious freedom is subject to certain 
limitations while simultaneously creating a high threshold for the government to 
meet in order to justify any restrictions on religious liberty.  The proviso creates this 
high threshold by limiting “the sorts of state interests that may override a demand 
for a free exercise exemption.”192  The proviso is tightly circumscribed, comparable 
to the third and fourth prongs of the Blount formulation—the compelling interest and 
least restrictive means analyses.193  Consistent with the maxim expressio unius est 
                                                                                                     
 187.  ME. CONST. art. I, § 3.       
 188.  McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1462. 
 189.  Id. 
 190.  Id. 
 191.  Michael W. McConnell, Freedom from Persecution or Protection of the Rights of Conscience?: 
A Critique of Justice Scalia’s Historical Arguments in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 819, 831 (1998) [hereinafter McConnell, Freedom from Persecution].  Justice Scalia criticized this 
reading of similar provisos in other state constitutions.  See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 538-
540 (Scalia, J., concurring).  In his view, any breach of any law is a breach of the peace.  Id.  Justice 
O’Connor, however, agreed that the provisos “would have been superfluous” unless the right to free 
exercise was viewed as “generally superior to ordinary legislation.”  Id. at 554-55 (O’Connor, J., 
dissenting).   
 192.  Crane, supra note 102, at 263; see Carmella, supra note 106, at 280-81; Stuart G. Parsell, Note, 
Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A Response to Employment 
Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 747, 765-66 (1993). 
 193.  See Carmella, supra note 106, at 281. 
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exclusio alterius,194 the proviso’s enumeration of specific limitations on free exercise 
establishes that only a “narrow[] subcategory of the general laws” can overcome an 
individual’s right to free exercise.195  The phrase “obstruct others in their religious 
worship” prevents privileging one individual’s religious liberty above another’s.  
The “public peace” limitation prevents religious claimants from seeking to “invade 
the private rights of others or to disturb public peace and order.”196  Absent some 
compelling reason such as the invasion of another’s religious liberty or the 
maintenance of public order, religious conduct must be accommodated.197 
A reading of the proviso allowing any generally applicable law to circumscribe 
religious liberty does not fit with the text of Section 3.  The term “public peace,” 
which “refer[s] to the fundamental peacekeeping functions of government,” stands 
in contradistinction to broader terms such as “happiness,” which “is a term as 
compendious as all of public policy,” and thus only allows a subset of laws—namely, 
those essential to maintaining a peaceful society—to outweigh the right to free 
                                                                                                     
 194.  The enumeration of certain exceptions “implicitly deny the availability of any other.”  Nevin v. 
Union Tr. Co., 1999 ME 47, ¶ 34, 726 A.2d 694 (quoting Musk v. Nelson, 647 A.2d 1198, 1202 (Me. 
1994)). 
 195.  McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1462; see Branton J. Nestor, Note, The Original 
Meaning and Significance of Early State Provisos to the Free Exercise of Religion, 42 HARV. J. L. PUB. 
POL’Y 971, 978-99 (2019) (explaining that “peace and safety” provisos “constituted . . . narrow 
exceptions to an otherwise broad free exercise right,” and did not encompass every violation of law). 
 196.  McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1464.   
 197.  The Law Court has rejected the argument that Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights provides 
even greater protection to free exercise than the compelling interest test.  See Blount v. Dep’t of Educ. & 
Cultural Servs., 551 A.2d 1377, 1385 (Me. 1988).  In so doing, it adopted the generalized balancing test 
set forth in Sherbert and Yoder, as other courts have.  See, e.g., First Covenant Church of Seattle v. City 
of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 186-188 (Wash. 1992) (applying compelling interest test).  There is an 
argument, however, that the proviso identifies the only two state interests that are sufficient to overcome 
the right to free exercise and does not create a general balancing test between religious freedom on the 
one hand and state interests on the other.  See id. at 192 (Utter, J., concurring) (rejecting need for a 
balancing test, and concluding that “[o]nly the government’s interest in peace and safety . . . can excuse 
an imposition on religious liberty”); Parsell, supra note 192, at 766.  As Justice Liacos noted in 
considering Massachusetts’ parallel provision, the proviso—read strictly—“guarantees . . . absolute 
freedom as to religious belief and liberty unrestrained as to religious practices, subject only to the 
conditions that public peace must not be disturbed or others not be obstructed in their religious 
worship.”  Commonwealth v. Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 600 (Mass. 1989) (Liacos, J., dissenting).  
This reading would further constrain the state interests that might limit free exercise.  The scope of the 
“obstruction of worship” limitation is relatively self-evident.  The scope of the “disturbance of the 
peace” limitation—of common law origin—likely refers to the crime of “disturb[ing] the peace of the 
public . . . by actions, conduct or utterances, the combination of which constituted a common nuisance.”  
Id. at 601 (Liacos, J., dissenting) (quoting Commonwealth v. Jarrett, 269 N.E.2d 657 (Mass. 1971)).  
That is, disturbance of the peace consists of “conduct which tends to annoy all good citizens and does in 
fact annoy anyone present not favoring it.”  Id. (Liacos, J., dissenting); see id. (Liacos, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the conduct must be “unreasonably disruptive” to most people and must also “infringe on 
someone’s right to be undisturbed”); Soc’y of Jesus of New Eng. v. Bos. Landmarks Comm’n, 564 
N.E.2d 571, 573-74 (Mass. 1990) (adopting Justice Liacos’ construction of “disturbing the peace” and 
implicitly overruling Nissenbaum’s broader reading equating that phrase to any violation of the law).  
Under Justice Liacos’s approach, if either the obstruction of worship or the disturbance of the peace 
limitation applies, then the religious liberty claim would fail.  If neither limitation applies, then the 
religious liberty claim would prevail without any balancing of interests.  This approach would 
substantially clarify what is an otherwise somewhat open-ended balancing test.  See State v. 
Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. 1990); McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1464. 
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exercise.198  In addition, were the proviso construed to permit any law of general 
applicability to constrain free exercise, the exception would swallow Section 3’s 
general rule that religious conduct is protected.199  Further, if the proviso were 
construed to subject free exercise to any generally applicable exercise of legislative 
power, thereby creating a Smith-like guarantee precluding discrimination but not 
permitting exemptions from generally applicable laws, it would render the equal 
protection clause of Section 3 superfluous:  that clause already expressly prevents 
discriminatory targeting of religious believers.   
In short, Section 3 establishes that only compelling government interests are 
sufficient to overcome the fundamental right to freedom of religion and embodies 
more than a nondiscrimination principle.  Section 3, and, specifically, the proviso 
limiting the free exercise of religion, creates a Sherbert/Yoder-style balancing test to 
determine whether accommodations of religion are constitutionally mandated.  
Religiously motivated conduct is protected, subject only to the strongest of state 
interests.  Absent such an interest, a believer should be exempted from a generally 
applicable law that substantially burdens his or her exercise of religion.  Section 3 
includes, but is not limited to, a guarantee of equal protection.   
C. Historical Analysis of Article I, Section 3  
Several different conceptions of religious liberty influenced the state 
constitutions adopted in the early United States.200  These views informed the debate 
over Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights, which was one of the longest debates of 
Maine’s constitutional convention.201  As this debate suggests, Section 3 embodies 
an expansive understanding of religious liberty that protects both belief and conduct, 
and therefore contemplates accommodations of religion—consistent with Blount and 
the above textual analysis.  The framers did not endorse the narrower conception of 
                                                                                                     
 198.  McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1463.  The term “public peace” was chosen despite 
the frequent use of broader terms, such as “the public good,” when used to describe the scope of 
legislative power.  Had the framers truly meant to subject free exercise to ordinary legislation, they 
would have used a broad term like “the public good.”  Accordingly, the best reading of the term “public 
peace” is that it is “confined to public disorder and violent or tortious injury to other persons.”  
McConnell, Freedom from Persecution, supra note 191, at 835-37; see Nestor, supra note 195, at 992-
93 (noting that “early state governments’ constitutional powers extended beyond securing the ‘peace 
and safety’ of the state”).  Further, “the terms ‘peace’ and ‘safety’ were historically defined by colonial 
charters and Founding-era dictionaries and commentaries to fall short of encompassing ‘all laws.’”  
Nestor, supra note 195, at 982. 
 199.  See Carmella, supra note 106, at 306-07.   
 200.  Professor Witte has identified four such views, which he categorizes as follows: Puritan, 
Evangelical, Enlightenment, and Civic Republican.  See JOHN WITTE, JR. & JOEL NICHOLS, RELIGION 
AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL EXPERIMENT 21-37 (4th ed. 2016); Witte, supra note 85, at 376-
89.  Some have debated the usefulness of this taxonomy, arguing that there was broad consensus on 
liberty of conscience as an unalienable right.  See, e.g., Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the 
Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 384-98 (2002).  Witte’s analysis, however, usefully 
distills distinctions among those with different views of the scope of religious liberty and is not 
inconsistent with the notion that liberty of conscience was widely supported.  See Adams & Emmerich, 
supra note 165, at 1582-95, 1599-1600 (classifying three views roughly consistent with the 
classifications adopted by Witte and noting commonalities). 
 201.  HATCH, supra note 2, at 152; see TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 
7. 
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free exercise exemplified by Smith and, ultimately, adopted a provision that “gave 
full liberty of conscience and of worship.”202  Indeed, the provision adopted by the 
convention has been described as guaranteeing “absolute freedom of religion.”203  
Constitutional history therefore supports the Blount test and confirms that Section 3 
is incompatible with Smith.   
1. Section 3 and Free Exercise as an Unalienable Right  
The text of Section 3 reflects a “theological view” of free exercise that stands in 
contradistinction to the “Enlightenment view” underlying Smith.  Under the 
Enlightenment view, often attributed to Thomas Jefferson, “the right to the free 
exercise of religious belief [is] beyond the reach of governmental control,” but, in 
contrast, government can “control religious conduct that might conflict with 
otherwise neutral general laws.”204  This view is reflected in Smith.  Regardless of 
the propriety of interpreting the First Amendment in accord with this view, “many 
. . . state constitutions embody broader understandings of religious liberty,” 
understandings advanced by—among others—James Madison.205  In Madison’s 
view, religious liberty is an unalienable right (not a matter of mere toleration), that 
protects conduct (not just beliefs) and is limited only by the necessity of preserving 
public order.206  Madison’s view, as will be seen, tracks closely with Section 3 of the 
Maine Declaration of Rights.   
Madison’s view can be traced back to evangelical groups, Baptists prominent 
among them, who asserted a “theological view” of free exercise.207  Proponents of 
the theological view called for “free exercise” of religion and “full and equal rights 
of conscience” because “religious liberty is a pre-political, fundamental human 
right.”208  They also emphasized the voluntary nature of religious convictions.209  
Under the theological view, civil government has no authority over matters of 
conscience because religious duties take precedence over civil duties and must be 
left to the conviction of every individual.210  Because “civil obligations are 
subordinate to religious duty,” then “where possible, those religious practices that 
                                                                                                     
 202.   HATCH, supra note 2, at 152. 
 203.  TINKLE, THE MAINE STATE CONSTITUTION, supra note 15, at 7; BANKS, supra note 2, at 155.   
 204.  Durham, supra note 110, at 353.  
 205.  Id. at 354. 
 206.  See DANIEL L. DREISBACH, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE WALL OF SEPARATION BETWEEN 
CHURCH AND STATE 86 (2002) (Madison’s conception of religious freedom departed “from the old-
world regime of religious toleration, in which religious exercise was a mere privilege that the civil state 
could grant or revoke at its pleasure”); Timothy L. Hall, Roger Williams and the Foundations of 
Religious Liberty, 71 B.U. L. REV. 455, 505-12 (1991); McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 
1443-44, 1452-53, 1464.  
 207.  The author uses the term “theological view” because it expressly relied on religious 
justifications for religious liberty.  Dunlap, supra note 147, at 2019 & n.84; see Steven D. Smith, The 
Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 149, 154 (1991).  
Professor Witte refers to it as the “evangelical view.”  Witte, supra note 85, at 381.   
 208.  Durham, supra note 110, at 359; see McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1443; Witte, 
supra note 85, at 382. 
 209.  WITTE & NICHOLS, supra note 200, at 26, 28.  
 210.  Smith, supra note 207, at 153-61; see McConnell, The Origins, supra note 82, at 1437-43, 
1453; Witte, supra note 85, at 382.   
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conflict with civil law” are to be accommodated.211  That this view has fallen out of 
common jurisprudential discourse does not minimize its importance in the 
development of religious liberty in the fledgling United States,212 nor its continuing 
relevance.213   
Proponents of the theological view argued that government is not a competent 
authority in matters of conscience because the demands of God on man’s conscience 
are supreme over all other demands and because matters of conscience, by their 
nature, entail freedom of choice.  Roger Williams—the Baptist dissenter and founder 
of Rhode Island, who apprenticed under the renowned jurist Sir Edward Coke and 
authored an early defense of the principle of liberty of conscience in the colonies214—
asserted that the “civil sword” is “of a material civil nature” and therefore “cannot, 
according to its utmost reach and capacity . . ., I say, cannot extend to spiritual” 
matters.215  He contended that matters of religious conscience were not entrusted to 
the oversight of government.216  According to Isaac Backus, a Baptist preacher who 
is credited with the disestablishment of the state church in Massachusetts217 and who 
authored a major treatise on religious liberty in 1773,218 “nothing can be true religion 
but a voluntary obedience unto [God’s] revealed will, of which each rational soul has 
an equal right to judge for itself.”219  Therefore, Backus argued, “every person has 
an unalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion of 
his own mind.”220  Their argument was echoed by others.221  James Madison distilled 
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it as follows:  “‘the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and 
such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him’ is ‘precedent, both in order of time 
and in degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society’ and ‘therefore that in 
matters of Religion, no man’s right is abridged by any institution of Civil 
Society.’”222   
Proponents of the theological view, however, also recognized the rightful sphere 
of civil government and accordingly advocated setting limits on the outer bounds of 
religious liberty.223  Roger Williams, firebrand though he was, contended that the 
“civil sword” is a “sword of civil justice,” and is rightly used “for the defense of 
persons, estates[,] families, liberties of a city or civil state, and the suppressing of 
uncivil or injurious persons.”224  Isaac Backus argued only that “every person has an 
inalienable right to act in all religious affairs according to the full persuasion of his 
own mind, where others are not injured thereby.”225  Again, this theme was 
consistently echoed by proponents of the theological view.226  Madison expressed it 
this way:  the right to free exercise should prevail “in every case where it does not 
trespass on private rights or the public peace.”227   
Williams and Backus are of particular importance to the development of 
religious freedom in New England.  Williams’s writings “provide a framework of 
argument and theory that is more comprehensive than those of any other writer prior 
to the constitutional period.”228  Williams established a “theoretical foundation that 
would justify the constitutional protection of religion and that would elaborate a basis 
for determining the limits of that protection.”229  His arguments informed those of 
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Backus and others who would participate in the formative constitutional debates 
regarding religious liberty.230  Backus was “one of the most influential advocates of 
religious freedom at the founding.”231  Backus actively began opposing the state-
established church in Massachusetts in 1748 and continued thereafter, advocating for 
a broad conception of religious liberty at the Massachusetts constitutional 
convention.232  Their view of religious liberty found fertile ground in Maine, where 
Baptists formed “the largest religious denomination” around the time Maine 
achieved independence in 1820.233   
Given the influential nature of the proponents of the theological view in New 
England generally, and Maine in particular, it is not surprising that Section 3 of the 
Declaration of Rights reflects the primary tenets of their view.  Section 3 expressly 
affirms that religious liberty is an “unalienable right.”234  It declares that every man 
is free to worship God “in the manner and season most agreeable to the dictates of 
that person’s own conscience,”235 thereby recognizing that matters of religion are 
outside the scope of civil cognizance and are left to individual conviction.  And, 
finally, it frames the limitations on religious liberty in terms of protecting “the public 
peace” and the “religious worship” of others,236 thereby establishing that religion 
cannot be used to disturb the peace or the individual rights of others.  The parallels 
between the theological view and Section 3 are patent.   
2. The Framers’ View of Religious Liberty  
The confluence of the theological view and Section 3 of the Declaration of 
Rights is no mere accident; rather, it reflects a reasoned choice.  The framers of the 
Maine Constitution debated at length the proper relationship between government 
and religion, and their conclusion was consistent with the theological view advanced 
by Williams, Backus, and Madison.  Perhaps not coincidentally, dissenting 
clergymen were well represented at the convention—including eight Baptist 
ministers.237  Their presence may well account for the constitutional convention’s 
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solicitude toward free exercise of religion, including “why the convention adopted 
no religious tests of any kind in the Constitution.”238  Notably, “[i]n the debate over 
what became Section 3 of Article I, no one contested the establishment of the 
principle of freedom of religion.”239  Further, as will be seen, none of the delegates 
echoed Thomas Jefferson’s Enlightenment view of religious liberty, with its 
“profound skepticism of organized religion.”240   
Instead, the debate reflected the influence of not only the theological view of 
religious liberty but also the “civic republican view” and the “Puritan view” —both 
of which had a strong influence in New England generally and Massachusetts in 
particular.241  Civic republicans “shared much common ground” with the theological 
view, but they “sought to imbue the public square with a common religious ethic and 
ethos.”242  The Puritan view, meanwhile, “readily countenanced the coordination and 
cooperation of church and state,” including material aid to churches, while “leaving 
little room for individual religious experimentation.”243  Massachusetts’s 
constitution reflected (at least in part) the civic republican and Puritan views, 
proclaiming that “[i]t is the right as well as the duty of all men in society, publicly 
and at stated seasons, to worship the SUPREME BEING, the great Creator and 
preserver of the universe.”244  Massachusetts also allowed for taxation for the support 
of public worship.245  In practice, moreover, Massachusetts long suppressed religious 
dissent.246   
The debate over whether the Maine Constitution should reflect such views of 
religious liberty, or instead the more voluntarist approach of the theological view, 
“occupied most of the debate on Article I at the 1819 Convention.”247  Ultimately, 
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the delegates opted “in favor of genuine religious freedom.”248  As Professor Esbeck 
has observed,   
Maine [at the time of its founding] was . . . a land of diverse religious influences 
populated by rugged individualists . . . . Competing religions and convictions 
concerning voluntaryism, as well as the independent spirit of the settlers, found their 
voice in Maine’s 1819 constitution. . . . The constitution did not establish any 
religion while ensuring religious liberty for the state’s diverse population.249   
This new course is evidenced by the framers’ debate over the wording of Section 3 
as well as the framers’ debate over religious exemptions from militia duty.   
a. Religious Liberty as an Unalienable Right 
As will be seen, the framers spent much time debating the language to be used 
in Section 3.  A large portion of that debate focused on whether the Maine 
Constitution ought to include a preamble, similar to that used in the Massachusetts 
Constitution, acknowledging man’s duties toward God.  The framers ultimately 
chose to exclude such language—not because they believed religion to be anathema, 
but because they concluded that religion is a voluntary matter of conscience beyond 
the jurisdiction of civil government. 
The debate over Section 3 began with a poignant moment.  A group representing 
the “Catholics of Maine” presented a petition to the convention stating that “under 
the Constitution of Massachusetts they were excluded from an equal participation of 
the benefits of government, and praying that by the new constitution, they might be 
admitted to an equality of religious and civil rights and immunities.”250  Judge Parris 
observed that “the object of the memorialists” would “doubtless be secured to them 
by the Bill of Rights, if adopted as reported.”251  He then moved that the petition lie 
on the table, and it was so ordered.252  It was with this clear indication of the drafting 
committee’s intent to enshrine a robust protection of religious liberty that the 
delegates took up consideration of Section 3.  After long debate, the convention 
placed religious practices largely beyond the purview of government, as the 
petitioners had hoped.253 
Following presentation of the petition, Judge Thacher moved to amend the text 
of Section 3 to include language declaring as follows:  “As it is the absolute duty of 
all men to worship God their creator, so it is their natural right to worship him in 
such way and manner as their conscience dictates, to be agreeable to his revealed 
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will.”254  He expressly declared it his purpose to place in the Declaration of Rights a 
recognition of the obligation to worship God.255  Dr. Rose immediately objected that 
the delegates had come “to establish a declaration of rights and not a prescription of 
duties.”256  Mr. Herrick, following Dr. Rose, raised no objection to declaring the duty 
of man to worship God, but suggested that it be made clear that the legislature could 
not enforce performance of that duty.  “Religion is in its nature personal, it is a quality 
of the heart,” he argued, “and not subject to human laws, which by their severe 
penalties commonly make hypocrites and bigots.”257  Mr. Holmes then rose to speak 
on behalf of the drafting committee.258  In his view, “[t]o make it a duty to exercise 
a right [was] preposterous.”259  “Worship,” he contended, “is the voluntary offering 
of the fruit of the heart to a Deity.”260  He ended with a stirring peroration, speaking 
of the drafting committee’s prior deliberations:   
We concluded, at length, to declare the people’s rights of conscience, without 
attempting to define their religious duties . . . . To prescribe the duty would be to 
authorize the Legislature to enforce it.  This would excite jealousy and alarm.  The 
worship of God is, and ought to be free.  Religious oppression brought our fathers 
to this country, and their descendants will not fail to resist it.261   
Judge Thacher’s motion “was lost by a great majority.”262   
Another motion along the same lines was made by Mr. Emery, who sought to 
amend Section 3 to read that “all men have a natural and unalienable right to exercise 
the duty of worshipping Almighty God.”263  The debate again focused on whether 
the state government ought to be able to declare man’s obligation to worship God.  
Mr. Holmes again took the position that the government has no authority to prescribe 
a manner of worship:  “If you mean the duty is to be performed in a particular way, 
then you prescribe the mode of performance, which we have no right to do.”264  Judge 
Green, in support of the motion, argued that it was the “duty” of government “to 
encourage” religion because it was “the best security of man.”265  Mr. Locke, a 
Baptist minister, responded with an appeal to voluntarism as stirring as that raised 
by Mr. Holmes in response to Judge Thacher’s motion:   
We ought not to be obliged to perform the duty of worshipping God by legislative 
power.  The Legislature is departing from its proper sphere, when it undertakes to 
regulate the intercourse between man and his Maker.  Religion being seated in heart, 
cannot in its own nature be cognizable by human laws.  And if we appeal to history, 
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we shall find little encouragement for legislating on this subject.  Pure religion 
always flourishes most, when it is left most free.266   
Judge Thacher protested that the amendment would not prescribe how to exercise 
the duty of worshiping God, but would instead “protect each worshipper to discharge 
the duty according to the dictates of his conscience.”267  Mr. Holmes responded that 
the constitution should not “prescribe duties” in regard to religion, and that religion 
stood best when undisturbed by government:  “I do not believe religion is in danger 
from liberality.  I trust it has better props, than any this Convention can establish.  
The people . . . sent us here to guard their civil rights, but not to instruct them in the 
precepts of religion.”268  Mr. Emery’s motion was also “lost by a large majority.”269   
The convention confronted a similar issue when Mr. Whitman introduced a 
motion to permit the Legislature to “encourage and support the institutions of public 
worship.”270  Whitman argued that religion “constitutes the basis of social order,” 
and that the government therefore has an interest in “promoting good morals.”271  Mr. 
Holmes again responded:  “Sir, I will never consent, on any consideration, to put any 
restraints upon conscience . . . . I tremble when I think of the fatal effects, which 
have resulted from the interference of the civil authority in matters of religion.”272  
And such a constraint and interference he viewed Whitman’s motion to be:  “Give 
your Legislature a power to uphold religion, and trust to their discretion for the 
suitable means, and you arm them with a weapon which might prostrate in the dust, 
your religious liberties.”273  Judge Thacher supported the amendment as a “salutary 
provision to preserve our existing wholesome institutions.”274  Judge Parris 
supported Holmes:  “As far as I can go with the gentleman [Mr. Whitman] to support 
the cause of religious principles, and leave the conscience free, so far I am with him.  
But I see the dangerous tendencies of the exercise of this power; and cannot consent 
to give it to them.”275  After further debate, Mr. Whitman’s amendment was “decided 
in the negative.”276   
This debate over the wording of Section 3 is notable on at least two levels, and 
it confirms that the framers meant to leave the exercise of religion as free as possible 
from government interference.  First, the entire debate is suffused with a solicitude 
toward religion.  The framers argued not over whether to protect religious liberty, 
but how best to do so.  No delegates suggested that religious liberty ought to merely 
be tolerated, or that religious beliefs should be granted more protection than religious 
conduct.  Instead, they presented two conflicting approaches to promoting religious 
liberty that were both solicitous toward religion.  Second, the debate is notable 
because the two competing approaches to religious liberty advanced by the 
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delegates—civic republicanism and the theological view—was clearly resolved in 
favor of the voluntarist theological view, with its broad conception of religious 
liberty.  The “great majority” of the constitutional convention affirmed a key tenet 
of that approach to religious liberty:  religion is a voluntary matter of the conscience, 
beyond the reach of civil authority.  It is entirely unsurprising, therefore, that Section 
3 comports with the theological view and frames the right to free exercise as an 
unalienable right that mandates accommodation of religion.   
b. Anticipating Accommodations of Religion 
The debate at the 1819 constitutional convention also indicates the framers’ 
sensitivity toward the need for accommodations of religion even in the face of the 
most compelling of state interests:  national defense.  The draft constitution initially 
presented to the convention permitted exemption of Quakers and Shakers from 
military duty.277  This provision led to substantial debate focusing on the necessity 
of, and the difficulties with, exemptions from militia duty.278  The compromise 
eventually struck allowed limited exemptions, not because of insensitivity toward 
claims of conscience, but because of the importance of national defense.   
Mr. Hall moved to amend the provision establishing the composition of the 
militia, namely, Article VII, Section 5, in a manner that would not have provided for 
exemptions.279  Mr. Redington objected because the amendment would draw into 
service members of “religious denominations, whose consciences forbid their doing 
military duty,” either by direct service or by paying an equivalent that may be equally 
unconscionable to such believers.280  Mr. Holmes likewise expressed concern that it 
would “interfere with the right of conscience, to compel these people to contribute 
to purposes of war,” yet he also acknowledged that “a state of things may exist, when 
it shall be necessary that they should contribute something for military purposes.”281  
Judge Thacher then posed a challenging question:  “[W]ho was to determine what a 
man’s conscientious scruples were; and when they were sincere?”282  He raised 
concerns with leaving it “to the consciences of individuals . . . to say whether they 
will obey a general law or not, and so, on that ground, claim an exemption from a 
general duty.”283  He was particularly concerned that, “in times of a national war, or 
when taxes bear heavily on the community,” it was likely that “hypocritical” claims 
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of conscience would proliferate.284  But even he did not oppose the granting of all 
exemptions from militia duty; rather, Judge Thacher contended that exemptions 
could be granted if based on clear religious principles and if the legitimacy of the 
claim could be verified.  On the first point, he acknowledged that “any law of man 
. . . contrary to, or forbidden by the laws of Christ’s kingdom, are null and void;” 
but, he said, those religious dictates “ought to be clear and express” if they are to be 
“paramount to all human laws.”285  On the second point, he proposed that exemptions 
could be extended on the basis of denomination; that is, Quakers could be exempted 
because it could readily be determined that they actually had a conscientious 
objection to war.286  Thus, despite generally rejecting the voluntarist view of Mr. 
Holmes and other delegates, even Judge Thacher acknowledged that exemptions 
from militia duty should be recognized if adequately supported.  The convention 
ultimately rejected Mr. Hall’s motion, with its no-exemptions language.287   
Colonel Atherton then introduced another motion that would have eliminated 
exemptions based on religious conscience.288  He acknowledged the “strong claims 
for exemption” by Quakers, but argued that, if the convention “exempt[ed] all those 
conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, what will become of our defence?”289  
In his view, “self defence” outweighed all claims of exemption.290  Atherton’s 
motion, like Hall’s, was defeated.291   
Further motions were made, and further debate was held, after Colonel 
Atherton’s motion was rejected.  Mr. Francis made a motion that all persons “whose 
religious sentiments forbid their engaging in war” may be exempted from military 
service without having to pay an equivalent.292  Mr. Holmes again noted the 
importance of claims of conscience by the Quakers, but also argued that, “in the 
extremest cases, when the ultimate safety of the State is in danger,” their claims of 
conscience might be outweighed and the state permitted to require payment of an 
equivalent.293  Mr. Francis’s motion lost.294  Several delegates then spoke in favor of 
allowing the Legislature to make exemptions.295  General Chandler acknowledged 
the need for exemptions for those with “conscientious scruples,” but also spoke in 
                                                                                                     
 284.  Id. at 269; see id. at 258. 
 285.  Id. at 261.  Judge Thacher believed that there was no fair basis in the Christian faith to object to 
paying an equivalent to serve on one’s behalf in the militia and expounded on that point at some length.  
Id. at 259, 262-67.  In an example of his paternalistic views toward religion, he concluded that anyone 
seeking an exemption from paying an equivalent were “very much confused” in their religious beliefs.  
Id. at 267.  
 286.  Id. at 267-69.  
 287.  Id. at 270. 
 288.  Id.  
 289.  Id. at 272. 
 290.  Id. 
 291.  Id. at 273.      
 292.  Id.  
 293.  Id. at 275. 
 294.  Id.  A similar motion was made later by Mr. Stockbridge, who protested that “[t]here are many 
in this Convention, who cannot vote for the constitution, unless this provision is made.”  Id. at 355.  His 
motion also lost.  Id. 
 295.  Id. at 276 (Mr. Preble:  arguing that it should be left “in the power of the Legislature to exempt 
those who were conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms”); id. at 277 (Colonel Moody:  “It was 
enough to say the Legislature may make exemptions”). 
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favor of requiring an equivalent in order to maintain “the militia for the defence of 
the State.”296  Colonel Atherton spoke again against allowing the Legislature to 
permit conscientious or other objections without payment of an equivalent, pointing 
to past difficulties in raising and funding a militia.297   
Ultimately, the convention adopted a provision that struck a compromise among 
these competing concerns.298  As adopted, Section 5 of Article VII permitted 
exemptions of “Quakers and Shakers” as well as “Ministers of the Gospel” from 
military duty.299  Quakers, Shakers, and clergymen were recognized to have such an 
unquestioned claim of religious conscience that they could be exempted even from 
the requirement to pay an equivalent; others could be exempted, but—given the 
strength of the state’s interests—would be required to pay an equivalent.300  
Accordingly, the framers recognized the necessity of religious exemptions, even in 
the context of military service. 
The debate over military exemptions was not definitive, but it was resolved in a 
manner consistent with the theological view of free exercise.301  It indicates that the 
framers accepted the concept that individual claims of conscience may require 
exemptions from generally applicable laws because of the superior claim of religious 
conscience.  It also indicates, however, that the framers recognized the necessity of 
ensuring the common defense as central to the role of civil government.  In the 
context of military duty—which implicates the most compelling of state interests—
the framers ultimately chose not to constitutionally mandate accommodation of 
religion.  They did, however, specifically provide that the Legislature was free to 
allow such exemptions.302  This approach was almost precisely the approach 
                                                                                                     
 296.  Id. at 277. 
 297.  Id. at 348-51. 
 298.  See generally HATCH, supra note 2, at 158. 
 299.  ME. CONST. OF 1820, art. VII, § 5.  The delegates expressly chose not to limit the exemption for 
“Ministers of the Gospel” to those who were “ordained and settled.”  DEBATES AND JOURNAL, supra 
note 1, at 355-58.  Judge Thacher and Colonel Moody supported including this limitation, because it 
would otherwise “be difficult to decide who were ministers of the gospel.”  Id.  Mr. Holmes spoke 
against the limitation, because “[t]here are many candidates and missionaries . . . who we do not want in 
the ranks of the militia.”  Id. at 355.  Mr. Locke also spoke against the limitation, as the “ordained and 
settled” language might prevent missionaries from being exempted from military service.  Id. at 356.  
Judge Dana lent his support to Mr. Holmes and Mr. Locke, arguing that toleration—not coercion—
should be the guiding principle, and that denominations might arise “who shall have able and pious 
teachers, who ought . . . to be exempted from military duty, and yet do not come within this 
description.”  Id. at 357.  “[H]ow unwise and how unjust,” he argued, “it would be to select those 
teachers of religion, and those only, who belong to particular denominations, as candidates for favour, to 
the exclusion of all others; it would be an invidious distinction, and such an one as I hope and trust we 
shall not adopt.”  Id.  The proposed limitation was stricken.  Id. at 358. 
 300.  ME. CONST. OF 1820, art. VII, § 5.   
 301.  The debate does not indicate that Article I, Section 3 fails to mandate exemptions for religious 
practices.  Although one could argue that no exemption would have been necessary in the militia clause 
if Section 3 requires accommodation of religion, this argument falls short.  Constitutionally mandated 
exemptions for religious believers might not apply to military service because of the compelling state 
interest in providing for the public defense. 
 302.  ME. CONST. OF 1820, art. VII, § 5.   
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advocated by Roger Williams.303  Accordingly, the debate indicates that the framers 
appreciated the difficult balancing required in accommodating religion and valued 
religious conscience even when it conflicted with a basic obligation of civil 
government—protection of the state.  Ultimately, they resolved the issue of 
exemptions from militia duty in a manner consistent with the theological view of 
religious liberty.304   
CONCLUSION 
The Law Court has established that the Maine Constitution still has independent 
vitality and must be accorded its proper place as a guarantor of the civil rights of 
Maine citizens.  The primacy approach to constitutional interpretation is sound, and 
the Law Court should renew its commitment to that jurisprudential approach, thereby 
giving the Declaration of Rights the attention that it is due.  Only by doing so can the 
liberties guaranteed therein—including the “unalienable right” of religious liberty—
be adequately protected.   
The free exercise clause illustrates the importance of the primacy approach.  As 
the Law Court has recognized, Section 3 of the Declaration of Rights guarantees that 
religious believers will be protected in their beliefs and conduct absent a compelling 
state interest.  The text of Section 3 mandates that the conscience of religious 
believers be accommodated as long as they do not violate the public peace or deprive 
others of religious liberty.  This mandate reflects more than the non-discrimination 
principle of Smith.  Instead, it reflects the framers’ commitment to vibrant conception 
of religious liberty for all—including minorities who, like the Catholics of their day, 
suffer oppression through the application of “neutral” laws.   
The Maine Constitution, even 200 years after its adoption, still matters—for 
civil liberties generally and free exercise of religion specifically.  To borrow the 
words of John Holmes, the Declaration of Rights ensures that the people of Maine 
remain as they “ought to be”:  free.   
  
                                                                                                     
 303.  Adams & Emmerich, supra note 165, at 1630 (noting that Williams asserted that “Quakers and 
Baptists . . . could not claim a right, divine or otherwise, to exemption from militia service” but allowed 
that it might be appropriate for “government to accommodate conscientious objectors”). 
 304.  See generally id. at 1634-35. 
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